Ronald Sneed, Plaintiff-appellant, v. James Gomez; William Merkle; D. Brazil; C. Beckman; G.p.douglas; H. Orr, Defendants-appellees.ronald Sneed, Plaintiff-appellant, v. D. Kelsey; D. Renauld; T. Lemke; M. Music; G. Higgins,h. Orr; R. Lasher; L. Martinez, Sr.,defendants-appellees.ronald Sneed, Plaintiff-appellant, v. M. Music; G. Higgins; R. Zimmerman; R. Martinez, Sr.; D.kelsey; T. Brewer; T. Lemke; D. Blankenship; J. Gomez;w. Clegg; R.l. Howell; Rene Hill; W. Merkley; S.bollinger, Defendants-appellees, 91 F.3d 154 (9th Cir. 1996)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal prisoner Ronald Sneed filed three complaints for damages claiming that prison officials had unconstitutionally deprived him of thirty days of good-time credit in each of three separate prison disciplinary hearings. The district court dismissed without prejudice all three complaints pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that Sneed's section 1983 actions were premature because he must first seek relief through a habeas corpus petition. When a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks would entitle him to an immediate or speedier release from imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). In this appeal, Sneed asserts that he is not seeking to have his credit losses restored, but that he seeks only monetary damages. However, a claim for damages for unconstitutional imprisonment that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under section 1983. Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372-73 (1994).

AFFIRMED.