United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Lissette Christina Nukida, Defendant-appellant, 87 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1996)

" 'Conduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 ... ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for [her] criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply.' " United States v. Hopper, 27 F.3d 378, 382 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 comment n. 4). "We review the district court's decision that a case is an extraordinary case justifying a simultaneous adjustment for obstruction of justice and acceptance of responsibility for clear error.... The sentencing judge is entitled to great deference [on review] because he is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility." Id. at 381-82 (citations and quotations omitted). " [T]he relevant inquiry for determining if a case is an extraordinary case ... is whether the defendant's obstructive conduct is not inconsistent with the defendant's acceptance of responsibility." Id. at 383.

Here, Nukida argues that her case is an "extraordinary case" because she confessed to her crime in 1991 and promptly accepted a plea agreement upon her return to custody. The district court found that Nukida's case was not an "extraordinary case" because between her confession and guilty plea, she fled to Mexico, where she remained for a year and a half, until she was arrested and deported to the United States by Mexican authorities. This finding is not "clearly erroneous." See id. at 381-82.

Accordingly, Nukida's sentence is

AFFIRMED.