Robert R. Parker, Jr., Plaintiff-appellant, v. Betty J. Reynolds; Oregon Government Ethics Commission,defendants-appellees, 8 F.3d 29 (9th Cir. 1993)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Robert Parker, Jr., appeals pro se the district court's denial of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to reinstate his complaint in his civil rights action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion, Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1991), and affirm.

"An appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion brings up the denial of the motion for review, not the merits of the underlying judgment." Id. Pursuant to Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from judgment for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud or other misconduct; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from operation of the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A motion brought under subsections 60(b) (1)-(3) must be brought within a year after the judgment or order was entered. See id.

Here, Parker filed a complaint against the defendants, members of the Oregon Government Ethics Committee ("OGEC"), on April 16, 1990, alleging that the OGEC violated his civil rights. Parker signed a release and agreed to settle the case in return for $3,000. Accordingly, the district court dismissed the action. Over a year later, Parker filed a motion for reconsideration.

In support of his motion for reconsideration, Parker argued that he was under economic duress at the time he agreed to settle, and that the release should be voided and the complaint reinstated due to various acts of misconduct on the part of the OGEC in securing the release. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that the motion, brought over a year after the entry of the judgment, was untimely pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (3).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The motion was properly construed as a Rule 60(b) (3) motion on the basis of Parker's allegations of misconduct by the OGEC. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (3). As such, the motion was properly denied as untimely. See id.¹  We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Rule 60(b) motion. See Floyd, 929 F.2d at 1400.

AFFIRMED.