78 F.3d 597: Edward Vaughn Keller, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, a Professional Corporation; Andlisa A. Yerkovich, Esquire, Richard H. Casper,esquire, and Sterling Jardine, Asindividuals, Defendants-appellees
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. - 78 F.3d 597
March 12, 1996
Before BRORBY, BARRETT and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.
ODER AND JUDGMENT1
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Edward Vaughn Keller (Keller), appearing pro se, appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants in dismissing Keller's diversity claims with prejudice and awarding defendants costs.
Keller filed this suit against the defendants after a business operation he owned and operated failed and creditors brought suits against him. Among those creditors was defendant Jardine Petroleum which obtained a judgment against Keller in approximate amount of $62,000.00, together with interest, costs and attorney fees of about $20,000.00. Defendant Sterling Jardine is Chief Executive Officer of Jardine Petroleum. Defendants Yerkovich and Casper are members of the law firm which represented Jardine Petroleum at all times involved here. Of the $62,000.00, some $45,000.00 had been recovered at the time of Keller's suit. Keller's complaint alleged abuse of process of law, conspiracy to abuse process of law, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He sought general damages of $50,000, punitive damages of $1,000,000 and such other relief as the court deemed proper.
The district court carefully analyzed the undisputed evidence and concluded that Keller had not stated a claim for abuse of process, excessive seizure, civil conspiracy or intentional infliction of emotional distress. We agree.
On appeal, Keller simply reasserts, in conclusory allegations, that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding the award of summary judgment. He contends discovery was not completed and that the case should be decided on the merits.
We recognize that pro se complaints and pleadings are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir.1988) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980)) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Thus, we review pro se pleadings under a liberal standard. Jones v. Cowley, 28 F.3d 1067, 1069 (10th Cir.1994).
We review the district court's order dismissing for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir.1995).
We have reviewed the entire record on appeal. We affirm for substantially the reasons set forth in the district court's "Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" entered and dated September 6, 1995.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of Tenth Cir. R. 36.3