Ralph Brinkley, and Lawrence Brinkley, As Minor Son,plaintiff-appellant, v. Evelyn Skjonsberg; Katrinka Brinkley; John Quinn; Maurice M.epstein, and King County; Boulder City Policedepartment, Boulder Township; Andboulder City; Sandrasaltskill,defendants-appellees, 60 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1995)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Ralph Brinkley, suing on behalf of himself and his minor son, appeals pro se the district court's: (1) dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Judge John Quinn, Magistrate Maurice Epstein, the City of Boulder City, his ex-wife, Katrinka and numerous other private individuals, and (2) denial of his motion for default judgment. We review de novo the district court's dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), Oscar v. University Students Co-op. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992), and for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a motion for default judgment, Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858 (1989). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.¹ 

* Dismissal

Brinkley contends that the district court erred by dismissing various defendants in his action alleging violations of his constitutional rights stemming from the state court issuance of a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and protective order. This contention lacks merit.

Here, the district court, after informing Brinkley of the deficiencies of his complaint and allowing him the opportunity to amend, dismissed all but three of the defendants. Brinkley voluntarily dismissed the remaining defendants. We agree with the district court that (1) Judge John Quinn and Court Commissioner Maurice Epstein were entitled to absolute judicial immunity because the complained of acts were performed in their official capacities, see Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986); (2) Brinkley failed to allege that the City of Boulder City acted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or custom, see Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978);²  and (3) private individuals Katrinka Brinkley, Evelyn Skjonberg, Susan Saltskill, Craig and Tanya Viner were not amenable to suit under section 1983, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal.³  See id.; Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1443; Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075.

II

Default Judgment

Brinkley also contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for default judgment against defendants Skjonsberg and Saltskill. This contention lacks merit.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 provides that default judgment may be entered when a party "has failed to plead or otherwise defend" an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The decision whether to enter a default judgment, however, is discretionary. See Alan Neuman Production, 862 F.2d at 1391. In addition, " [a] federal court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been served properly under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4." Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Technologies, Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988).

Here, the district court denied Brinkley's motion for default judgment against Skjonberg because Skjonberg had filed an answer, and against Saltskill because Saltskill had not been properly served. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brinkley's motions for default judgment. See id.; Alan Neuman Production, 862 F.2d at 1391.

AFFIRMED.