Georgene Koppleman, Plaintiff-appellant, v. City of Los Angeles; Los Angeles Police Department; Kathywilder; Paul Hernandez; Stanley Chavez; Ronaldsanchez; Joseph Bonino, Defendants-appellees, 142 F.3d 444 (9th Cir. 1998)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California William D. Keller, District Judge, Presiding.

Before WIGGINS and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges and SMITH^** , District Judge.

MEMORANDUM^* 

On de novo review, see Hoestery v. City of Cathedral City, 945 F.2d 317, 318 (9th Cir. 1991), we reach the same conclusion as the district court for substantially the same reasons.

The statute of limitations required Koppelman to file a charge with the EEOC "within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). She filed her complaint with the EEOC on May 30, 1995. Therefore, the alleged unlawful employment practice of which she complains must have occurred no earlier than July 25, 1994 or her claim is time-barred.

Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S. Ct. 498, 66 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1980), holds that "the proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful." Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S. Ct. 28, 70 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1981) ("In Ricks, we held that the proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful. The fact of termination is not itself an illegal act.").

Ricks explicitly focused on the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint in determining when the alleged discriminatory act took place. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257; see also Hoesterey v. City of Cathedral City, 945 F.2d 317, 329 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that in " [a]applying the Ricks/Chardon analysis to the case at bar we begin by identifying precisely the unlawful employment practice of which [the plaintiff] complains"). The discriminatory act alleged in Koppelman's complaint is sex discrimination and her complaint explicitly states when this occurred:

33. On or about October 15, 1992 and until her termination on May 9, 1994, Plaintiff was harassed both in her employment and in her private life and was unlawfully discriminated on account of her sex in violation of 42 U.S.C.2003 et seq.

Koppelman Complaint, p 33 (emphasis added). Because May 9, 1994, the last date of the alleged discriminatory act, was earlier than July 25, 1994, Koppelman's suit was barred by the statute of limitations.

Koppelman argues that she was not terminated until January 23, 1995, when the Board of Civil Service Examiners ruled that "the discharge be sustained." This does not allow for a different result, under Ricks. The Board decision does not purport to establish a later termination date than the one pleaded; rather, it purports to sustain a termination previously imposed. "The grievance procedure, by its nature, is a remedy for a prior decision, not an opportunity to influence that decision before it is made." Ricks, 449 U.S. at 261 (emphasis in original).

The district court's dismissal of Koppelman's complaint is AFFIRMED.