William S. Gould, M.d., Plaintiff-appellant, v. the Everett Clinic, a Washington Corporation; James Finley,m.d. and Jane Doe Finley, a Marital Community; Richardcooper, M.d. and Jane Doe Cooper, a Marital Community;james Pinkham, M.d. and Jane Doe Pinkham, a Maritalcommunity; Thomas Stonecipher, M.d. and Jane Doestonecipher, a Marital Community; Brian Hallgrath, M.d. Andjane Doe Hallgrath, a Marital Community; John Does, Andjane Does 1 Thru 5, and Their Marital Communities,defendants-appellees, 139 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 1998)

MEMORANDUM^* 

William Gould appeals pro se the district court's summary judgment for his former employer, the Everett Clinic Co., in Gould's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 civil rights action alleging discrimination on the basis of race.¹  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, see Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1995), and we affirm.

Gould contends that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Everett Clinic on Gould's Section 1981 claim that he was prevented from becoming a shareholder in the clinic and constructively discharged because he is Jewish.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Gould was required to show that: (1) he was a member of a racial minority; (2) he was eligible to become a shareholder; (3) he was denied shareholder status despite his eligibility; and (4) that similarly situated non-Jewish physicians were made shareholders. See McDonnell Douglas, Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

Here, it is undisputed that Gould did not ask to become a shareholder. Gould presented no evidence that similarly situated non-Jewish physicians became shareholders. Accordingly, Gould failed to establish his prima facie case of discrimination.

A constructive discharge occurs when, looking at the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt that he was forced to quit because of intolerable and discriminatory working conditions. See Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).

Gould has offered only conclusory allegations of religious discrimination and has not established that a reasonable employee would have felt forced to quit because of intolerable and discriminatory circumstances. See Forsberg v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418-19 (9th Cir. 1988) (plaintiffs can not rely on conclusory allegations to establish discrimination). Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants.

Gould contends that this court should construe his claim as one for religious discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (Title VII). This court declines to consider this claim because it was raised for the first time on appeal. See Komatsu v. Steamship Co., 674 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1982).

AFFIRMED.²