Adolfo Almazan-villegas, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent, 129 F.3d 124 (9th Cir. 1997)

MEMORANDUM^* 

The BIA may assume without deciding statutory eligibility and choose to deny the relief Almazan-Villegas seeks as a matter of discretion. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976). We must affirm the BIA's exercise of discretion as to suspension of deportation and waiver of inadmissibility if it supported "its conclusions with a reasoned explanation based upon legitimate concerns." Vargas v. INS, 831 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1987); see Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 360-61 (1956); Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562, 1570 (9th Cir. 1994). The BIA expressed legitimate concerns regarding Almazan-Villegas' honesty and forthrightness in answering questions both before and during his deportation hearing. Even if the BIA had considered Almazan-Villegas' acts of fraud upon entering the United States--which it didn't--Braum v. INS, 992 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 1993), and Delmundo v. INS, 43 F.3d, 436, 440 (9th Cir. 1994), would not help him. In INS v. Yang, 117 S. Ct. 350, 352-53 (1996), the Supreme Court held that initial entry fraud may be considered in deciding whether to grant discretionary relief. The BIA reasonably considered the factors weighing in Almazan-Villegas' favor and decided not to exercise its discretion to grant him suspension of deportation or waiver of inadmissibility.

AFFIRMED.