The People of the Territory of Guam, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Daniel Lucien Turner, Defendant-appellant, 106 F.3d 408 (9th Cir. 1997)

Before: REINHARDT and RYMER, Circuit Judges; TANNER,^***  District Judge.

MEMORANDUM^** 

Daniel Lucien Turner appeals the district court appellate division's affirmance of his conviction by jury trial in Guam superior court for aggravated murder, burglary, robbery, and possession and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony. His sole claim on appeal is that his counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a statutory speedy trial claim before the district court, following the superior court's rejection of that claim. The district court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1424-3(a) & (b). We have jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1424-3(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Turner must demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficiency, the result of Turner's appeal would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694-95 (1984). "The customary procedure for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in federal criminal trials is by collateral attack on the conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065, 1074 (9th Cir. 1987). Typically, habeas is a more appropriate route because the record on direct appeal "often lacks a sufficient evidentiary basis as to what counsel did, why it was done, and what, if any, prejudice resulted." United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 135 (1996). However, in a case such as this, where the necessary facts are clear from the record and the result turns on a question of law, we may review de novo an ineffective assistance claim brought on direct appeal. See id.

We grant Turner's motion to supplement the record with Guam superior court pleadings on the speedy trial issue; however, we hold that Turner's ineffective assistance claim fails because he cannot show Strickland prejudice.

Turner claims that under the Guam speedy trial statute, 8 Guam Code Ann. § 80.60, the People of the Territory of Guam were required to retry him within forty-five days of the issuance of the Ninth Circuit's March 11, 1993 mandate, which reversed a prior conviction. However, the Guam statute pertains only to the time period following arraignment; it says nothing about the time period following a reversal on appeal, ordering a new trial. We will not read additional conditions into the Guam statute where the plain language is clear. See People of Territory of Guam v. Iglesias, 839 F.2d 628, 629 (9th Cir. 1988); People of Territory of Guam v. Borja, 732 F.2d 733, 736 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 919 (1984).¹ 

Because Turner has no valid statutory speedy trial claim,²  there was no prejudice from his counsel's failure to reassert that losing claim on appeal to the district court. Consequently, Turner cannot demonstrate Strickland error, and his ineffective assistance claim fails as a matter of law.

AFFIRMED.