William S. Sarsfield, Former Chairman of the Board Andcurrent Director of Sequoia National Bank, Petitioner, v. United States Department of the Treasury, Respondent, 105 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 1997)

MEMORANDUM^* 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An agency's findings of fact must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Transcon Lines v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 89 F.3d 559, 564 (9th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id.

Agency decisions may be set aside only if arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Id. at 563.

DISCUSSION

Sarsfield was an executive officer and Chairman of the Board at Sequoia National Bank when the consent order was signed in March 1992. He did not relinquish his executive position until August 1992, at which point the Articles at issue had already been violated. He remained Chairman of the Board into January 1993. Sarsfield was an institution-affiliated party as an executive and as a director. As such, he was responsible for Sequoia's compliance with the consent order. His intent is inapposite. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (2) (A).

Sarsfield argues that, for a variety of reasons, the Comptroller's conclusion that seven Articles of the consent order had been violated was not supported by substantial evidence. We have carefully reviewed the record. Sarsfield's contentions are not supportable. In particular, this record does not demonstrate 1) illicit collusion between the OCC and members of Sequoia's board; 2) that the OCC was unaware of the source of documents; 3) that the OCC waived compliance with any of the Articles; 4) that Sarsfield acted entirely in good faith to comply with the consent order; or 5) that bank management, not Sarsfield, was responsible for noncompliance. Further, Sarsfield recognizes, as he must, that some consent order Articles were not complied with in the time required.

The Comptroller's findings that Articles VI, VII, IX, X, XII, XIII, and XV of the consent order were violated, and the imposition of a $10,000 Civil Money Penalty for those violations, are supported by substantial evidence. The Comptroller's decisions were neither arbitrary nor capricious.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.