Lawrence S. Krain, M.d., Plaintiff-appellant, v. Milton C. Grimes, et al. Defendants,andkeith Monroe, Defendant-appellee, 956 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir. 1992)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Lawrence C. Krain appeals pro se the district court's order dismissing his complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) because he failed to comply with Fed R.Civ.P. 8(a) (2). We dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

We raise sua sponte the issue of our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See Abernathy v. Southern Cal. Edison, 885 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1989). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court has jurisdiction over appeals from final orders of the district court. A district court order which dismisses an action as to only some of the defendants is not a final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822, 823 (1987); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1980). Such an order is not appealable without district court certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Frank Briscoe Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 776 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).

Here, the district court granted defendant Monroe's motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b) because Krain failed to comply with Rule 8(a) (2) which requires "a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Krain filed a notice of appeal from this order. The district court order is not a final order because it did not dispose of all claims against all parties. See Unioil, 809 F.2d at 554.¹  Further, we decline to remand to district court for consideration of whether certification under Rule 54(b) would be appropriate. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

DISMISSED.