Unpublished Disposition, 936 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1991)

Raymond MILLER and Mary Miller, Plaintiffs,v.NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation,et al., Defendants.CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS' SERVICE, dba Blue Shield ofCalifornia, Cross-Claimant/Appellant,v.INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, and Cigna Company,Cross-Defendants/Appellees.

No. 90-15312.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 15, 1991.Decided July 2, 1991.

Before SCHROEDER and FARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DUMBAULD,^*  District Judge.

MEMORANDUM^** 

This appeal involves a claim by the appellant, Blue Shield of California, against appellees Insurance Company of North America and CIGNA Corporation, to recover benefits Blue Shield paid to a claimant which Blue Shield claims should have been paid by appellees. Appellees moved for summary judgment, claiming that the district court lacked jurisdiction. In response, Blue Shield maintained that jurisdiction was well-founded on the basis of several theories, all grounded on federal, as opposed to state, law. The district court, in a comprehensive and well-reasoned order, ruled against Blue Shield on all of the federal theories of jurisdiction.

In this appeal, Blue Shield asserts that federal jurisdiction for its claim is grounded on the express provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3), which provides:

A civil action may be brought-- ... by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan....

Blue Shield contends that as a fiduciary of the ERISA plan insuring the claimant's wife (the Stockton Plan), it may assert a claim against appellees, who are fiduciaries of the separate ERISA plan insuring the claimant (the Ad Art Plan).

The district court agreed that Blue Shield was a fiduciary, but correctly pointed out that Blue Shield was a fiduciary only of the Stockton Plan, not the Ad Art Plan maintained by appellees. The district court properly interpreted the provisions of section 1132(a) (3) to authorize a suit by a fiduciary to enforce duties owed under the plan of which it is a fiduciary, and not to enforce obligations of other fiduciaries under other plans. As the district court aptly stated:

In the matter at bar, Blue Shield claims rights derived from the failure of INA to pay [the claimant's] medical bills under Ad Art's Plan. Accordingly, it is that plan and the rights thereunder that are in issue because Blue Shield is not a fiduciary of the plan maintained by Ad Art and INA and it does not have standing to sue as a fiduciary under ERISA relative to its claim against INA.

This conclusion is supported not only by the Third Circuit's unanimous ruling in Northeast Department ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1985) (terms of one pension fund cannot be enforced by trustees of separate pension fund under section 1132), but is also supported by our holding in Board of Trustees v. California Co-op Creamery, 877 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1989) (under ERISA, duties of a fiduciary are owed only to beneficiaries and participants of its own plan, not to others). It is also consistent with our holdings that ERISA does not provide for contribution among co-fiduciaries. See Call v. Sumitomo Bank of California, 881 F.2d 626, 630-32 (9th Cir. 1989); Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1989).

Blue Shield does not in this appeal urge any of the alternate theories of federal jurisdiction it presented to the district court and which troubled the Third Circuit in ILGWU. See 764 F.2d at 154-59; id. at 164-66 (Sloviter, J., dissenting); id. at 166-67 (Fullam, J., dissenting). Therefore, we do not have occasion in this appeal to comment upon them.