Unpublished Disposition, 936 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1991)

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 936 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1991)

Herbert GREENE, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.TELEDYNE ELECTRONICS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 90-55677.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 6, 1991.Decided June 24, 1991.

Before GOODWIN, PREGERSON and ALARCON, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM* 

Herbert Greene sued his employer Teledyne Electronics for damages and other relief stemming from discriminatory training, discriminatory treatment on the job, and discriminatory separation from employment. He appeals a summary judgment in favor of the employer. We affirm.

Greene's affidavits and deposition testimony raise no triable issue of fact on his claim that Teledyne excluded him from training opportunities offered other employees. Greene was trained on computers at or about the same time as his fellow workers. Greene admitted that he was never denied access to a class in which he expressed interest. The trial judge correctly disposed of this claim.

Greene's claim that the workplace was racially hostile rests upon four instances of offensive language by other workers. Greene reported one incident to his superiors, in vague and general terms, and he admitted that remedial action was taken and that racial harassment ceased from that time forward. Occasional, sporadic remarks that occur in the workplace do not impose Title VII liability upon the employer. Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1990). Where the employer knows about facts constituting a continuing pattern or practice and fails to take remedial action, a claim may have some substance. See Silver v. KCA Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978). But in this case, the undisputed evidence shows no more than sporadic use of offensive language and immediate remedial action when an episode was brought to the attention of management. The trial judge correctly disposed of this claim.

Greene's claim of discriminatory separation is similarly unsupported by a sufficient showing of facts to justify sending the case to trial. The undisputed facts, based on Greene's own deposition as well as uncontradicted affidavits from the employer, were that Teledyne, a defense contractor, was required by the Department of Defense to reduce by ten percent the number of persons carrying security clearance for defense work who, for more than six months, had not been assigned work for which clearance was needed.

Teledyne showed that the reduction of under-utilized security clearances was racially neutral, and Greene offered nothing to the contrary. He was given an equal opportunity, along with a number of fellow workers who were not members of a minority race, to accept a security clearance downgrade and continue to work at other jobs. Greene refused to accept the security downgrade, and in due course he was given his termination papers.

Because Greene failed to rebut Teledyne's evidence that race was not a factor in the security clearance downgrades and was not a factor in the decision to terminate those who refused to accept the downgrade, Greene failed to show that a material question of fact remained for trial. See DeHorney v. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav., 879 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1989).

Greene also complained that his reassignment to work was racially motivated, but, other than his bald assertion, the record contains no support for the claim. The trial court correctly found that Greene had presented no facts showing that any employment decision about which he complained was racially motivated. Accordingly, summary judgment was justified.

Finally, he challenges the dismissal of his common law claim against his employer for breach of his implied contract of employment. He points to nothing in the record to show that he had any claim under California law to anything but at-will employment under Cal.Lab.Code Sec. 2922. The trial court correctly disposed of this claim. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373 (1988).

AFFIRMED.

 *

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3

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