Unpublished Disposition, 933 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1991)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Margo Jones, et al., officials of the Arizona Department of Corrections ("Appellants") appeal from the district court's order denying their motion to set aside a default judgment entered against them, and awarding money damages to Oscar P. Rucker, an Arizona state prisoner. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Appellants contend that the district court's award of money damages against them pursuant to a default judgment entered in favor of Rucker in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action was improper because Rucker did not bring his section 1983 action against appellants in their individual capacities.¹ Thus, they argue, Rucker's action is barred by the eleventh amendment, and consequently, the district court's award of money damages against them Rucker was error. We disagree.

The eleventh amendment bars claims against state officials sued in their official capacities for money damages. See Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F.2d 1352, 1353 (9th Cir. 1988). We have held, however, that under section 1983, "a plaintiff may sue a state officer in his individual capacity for alleged wrongs committed by the officer in his official capacity." Price v. Akaka, 915 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1990) (as amended); Blaylock, 862 F.2d at 1353. We liberally construe a plaintiff's pro se complaint. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

It is unclear from Rucker's pro se complaint whether he sued appellants in their individual or official capacity. Appellants claim that because Rucker lists the official titles of appellants parenthetically in the caption of his complaint, Rucker brought suit against them in their official capacities. We find this evidence inconclusive. Because it is unclear from the complaint whether Rucker sued the appellants in their individual or official capacities or both, we liberally construe Rucker's complaint and conclude that he sued the individual state officials in their personal capacities. See id.; Soffer v. City of Costa Mesa, 798 F.2d 361, 363 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, Rucker's action, insofar as it was against appellants as individuals for wrongs committed in their official capacities was not barred by the eleventh amendment. See Price, 915 F.2d at 473. Therefore, we will not disturb the district court's award of money damages pursuant to its order of default against appellants. See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 1985) (court must affirm an award for money damages unless clearly unsupported by the evidence). Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.