Unpublished Disposition, 931 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1991)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Scott Sanders, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Cattell in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990). We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law. Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 1989).

Sanders, formerly housed in the Florence Special Programs Unit (SPU) of the Arizona Department of Corrections, filed this civil rights action alleging denial of equal access to the courts. He alleged that the inmates in SPU were discriminated against because they were allowed only approximately four hours and twenty minutes in the law library per week, whereas general population inmates were allowed in excess of 38 hours per week in the law library. In addition, he alleged that SPU did not have any legal assistants to help SPU inmates with their legal problems.¹ 

Bounds v. Smith requires that prison authorities must provide inmates with "meaningful access" to the courts. 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1984). To guarantee this right, Bounds requires prisoners to be provided with "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 430 U.S. at 828 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Prisons are not required, however, to provide the maximum or even the optimal level of access. See Lindquist v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 1985). " [T]he Constitution does not guarantee a prisoner unlimited access to a law library." Id. Thus, although the library access here may have been less then optimal, the access provided to Sanders was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Bounds. Moreover, taking as true Sanders's allegation that the inmates housed in SPU were not provided legal assistants, he did not state a constitutional violation. The requirements of Bounds are expressed in the alternative and because Sanders had adequate access to the law library, the prison was not required to provide him with a legal assistant. Thus, summary judgment for the defendant was proper.

Sanders also alleged that the law library was inadequate because it did not have all legal books and many books were not up-to-date. Prisons "need not provide its inmates with a library that results in the best possible access to the courts. Rather, the prison must provide inmates with a library that meets minimal constitutional standards." Lindquist, 776 F.2d at 856 (citation omitted). The few examples given by Sanders do not show that the books in the library are so out of date as to be of no use. Sanders's claim that the library does not have the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is belied by his including a photocopy of the cover of the Federal Rules book in his papers submitted to the district court. Thus, this claim has no merit.

Sanders next alleged that his rights were violated because he was denied the job of legal assistant. Prisoners do not have a general constitutional right to work. Baumann v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 1985). Under Arizona law, the employment of prisoners is left to the discretion of prison officials. See Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 31.251 (1989). As such, Arizona has not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right to a prison job. See Baumann, 754 F.2d at 844 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1983)). Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for the defendant in Sanders's claim for denial of a job as legal assistant.

Finally, Sanders alleged his rights were violated because he was denied free photocopying. Sanders has alleged no injury, however, as a result of the refusal of his request for unlimited free photocopying. Thus, he has made no showing that the denial of his free photocopy request violated his constitutional right of access to the courts. See Jones v. Franzen, 697 F.2d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 1983) (right of access to courts does not include the right to make photocopies unless denial of copying privileges prevents prisoner from exercising right of access to courts).

AFFIRMED.