Unpublished Disposition, 928 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1991)

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 928 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1991)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Bradley M. HOPKINS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 90-30230.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 20, 1991.* Decided March 22, 1991.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon; No. CR-89-60018-MFM, Malcolm F. Marsh, District Judge Presiding.

D. Or.

AFFIRMED.

Before CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, DAVID R. THOMPSON and RYMER, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM** 

Bradley M. Hopkins appeals his conviction, following a conditional guilty plea, for conspiracy to manufacture, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846. Hopkins contends that the district court erred by failing to suppress evidence because (1) the officer who stopped the vehicle in which he was a passenger, lacked a founded suspicion of criminal conduct, and (2) the subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle was illegal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

We review the existence of founded suspicion de novo. United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Thomas, 844 F.2d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1988). The existence of probable cause is also reviewed de novo. United States v. Salazar, 805 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986).

A police officer may not stop a vehicle even for the limited purpose of questioning its occupants unless the officer has a founded suspicion of criminal conduct. United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1989). Founded suspicion should be based on the totality of the circumstances and must exist at the time the officer initiates the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989); Thomas, 844 F.2d at 681; Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d at 1416. Founded suspicion exists when an officer is aware of specific articulable facts that, together with rational inferences drawn from them, reasonably warrant a suspicion that the person to be detained has committed or is about to commit a crime. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 416-18 (1981); United States v. Robert L., 874 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 1989).

A police officer who has legitimately stopped a vehicle may conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle if the officer has probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence is concealed somewhere within the vehicle. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985); United States v. Vasquez, 858 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1988). An officer may also conduct a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle immediately following the lawful arrest of the vehicle's occupant. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); United States v. Lorenzo, 867 F.2d 561, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, Officers Michael Mann and Robert Anderson were advised by the police dispatcher that seven days earlier, a retail store employee in Albany had reported to a police detective that two men smelling like cat urine had purchased a series of items at the store which could be used for drug manufacture. The dispatcher directed the officers to the store after telling them that the employee had just called again to report that the same two men had returned to the store, bought the same items, and again had a very strong odor of cat urine. The officers arrived at the store, were directed to the van that the two men had gotten into, and followed the van as it exited the store parking lot. The officers followed the van for one half mile before pulling it over. The decision to stop the van was based on the reports of the store employee which indicated that the van's occupants were engaged in a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. This information was sufficient to give the officers a founded suspicion to stop the van.

As the officers walked towards the van they observed boxes of glassware in the back of the van and detected a slight odor of methamphetamine. Additionally, Officer Mann recognized Hopkins as a user and distributor of methamphetamine and, after running a warrant check on him, discovered that a statewide warrant was out on him. These factors were sufficient to convert the officers' founded suspicion of criminal activity into probable cause, and therefore, the warrantless search of the van was legal. Alternatively, the warrantless search of the van was proper as incident to Hopkins' arrest.

Thus, the district court properly denied the motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the stop and search of the van. See Thomas, 844 F.2d at 682-3; Vasquez, 858 F.2d at 1391; Lorenzo, 867 F.2d at 561-62; see also Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885.

AFFIRMED.

 *

This case is suitable for submission without oral argument because the legal standard is established and the result is clear. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4

 **

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

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