Unpublished Disposition, 927 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1991)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Kirk H. Cashmere appeals a summary judgment in favor of the United States in its action to recover the unpaid principal and interest on Cashmere's student loan. The only issue is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the date interest liability commenced. We affirm.

The repayment period on a loan issued under the Federal Insured Student Loan Program (FISLP), begins, and interest accrues, nine months after the student "ceases to carry ... at least one-half the normal full-time academic workload." 20 U.S.C. § 1077(a) (2) (B) (1976); see United States v. Frisk, 675 F.2d 1079, 1080-81 & n. 2 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).

In opposing the government's motion for summary judgment, Cashmere submitted an affidavit in which he asserted that he received an extended graduation date to complete course work worth eight credit hours. He also asserted that eight credit hours equaled one-half the required undergraduate workload at the University. The government replied by submitting a copy of the University's response to the Bank's request for information. The case turns on the meaning of these documents.

The district court found that Cashmere's opinion did not overcome the University's determination that he was not carrying at least half the normal full-time workload and thus, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Cashmere's enrollment status.

A review of the exhibits supports the court's finding. Cashmere's exhibits do not show the number of credit hours associated with his course, or the number of credit hours required for a normal full-time academic workload. His exhibits only establish that he received an extended completion date for a single course necessary for graduation. Cashmere's declarations, by themselves, are not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

Cashmere raises two arguments to support his contention that the district court erred. First, he asserts the University only determined Cashmere's last date of physical attendance at the University. Physical attendance may well be, as Cashmere argues, irrelevant to the determination of whether a student carries at least one-half the normal full-time academic workload. However, both Cashmere and the government agree that the date a student ceases to carry at least one-half the normal full-time academic workload is the sole factor in determining when the repayment period on a FISLP loan begins.

The statutes and regulations governing repayment of FISLP loans refer exclusively to a student's workload rather than to attendance. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1077(a) (1976); 45 C.F.R. Sec. 177.1(k) (1978) (defining "half-time student" as one "who is carrying at least one-half the normal full-time academic workload as determined by the institution"). The district court relied on a form provided by the Bank to the University asking for Cashmere's " [l]ast date of attendance on at least a half-time basis" (emphasis added). Cashmere seizes upon the terms of the Bank's request to suggest that the University's response may not have reflected the level of Cashmere's academic workload.

Because the University was required by regulation to certify to the Bank that Cashmere was carrying at least one-half the normal full-time academic workload at the time he obtained his loan, see 45 C.F.R. Sec. 177.44(a) (3), it is difficult to say the University was unaware of the distinction between Cashmere's physical attendance and academic workload for FISLP purposes. The district court correctly found that the University understood the nature of the Bank's request "and that it would impact upon [Cashmere]'s loan status."

The court found that the language of section 1077(a) (2) (B) "ceases to carry ... at an eligible institution at least one-half the normal full-time academic workload as determined by the institution," is plain on its face. The phrase "as determined by the institution," permits the University to determine what constitutes a full or half-time workload. After the institution has determined that a particular student ceased to carry at least one-half the normal full-time workload, the district court is entitled to hold that there is no material question of fact unless Cashmere's evidence addressed the University's determination. Cashmere failed to contradict the University's assertion of the material fact on the question. Cashmere's opinion was, therefore, insufficient to withstand the motion.

It was Cashmere's burden to designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). He failed to do so.

AFFIRMED.