Unpublished Disposition, 927 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1991)
Annotate this CaseBryant M. LEWIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.L. William SEIDMAN, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 90-15598.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Mar. 1, 1991.* Decided March 5, 1991.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, No. CV-90-0003-JPV; John P. Vukasin, District Judge, Presiding.
N.D. Cal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Before FLETCHER, PREGERSON and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM**
Bryant M. Lewis appeals pro se the district court's dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) of his complaint of discrimination on the basis of handicap. Lewis claims the district court incorrectly concluded that his complaint failed to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse the dismissal.
We review de novo a district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, accepting as true all material allegations in the complaint. Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 1988). The district court was bound to construe Lewis' pro se complaint liberally. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). "Review is limited to the contents of the complaint." Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990). The Rehabilitation Act forbids discrimination against, not only those with substantially limiting impairments, but also those regarded as having such impairments. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B); Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.702(a) (3)).
Lewis applied in 1987 for a position as Bank Examiner Trainee with the FDIC. Lewis claims that Jeffrey Toreson, the FDIC interviewer, perceived him as handicapped and told him during his interview that he "could not communicate or deal effectively with other people," that he "had a problem with speaking," that he "was probably one of those who do well only in college and not in career life," and that he lacked "dynamism," "vitality," and "motivation," which indicated a "defeatist attitude or something." Lewis was not offered a job with the FDIC. After exhausting his administrative remedies, he filed the present suit, alleging that the FDIC perceived him as an individual handicapped by "lack of motivation" and sundry verbal impairments which substantially limited him in the "major life activity," working, and that the FDIC's failure to offer him a job thus amounted to illegal discrimination. The district court granted the FDIC's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), finding that, even if Lewis adequately alleged a substantial impairment, he failed to allege that Toreson knew of the impairment.
We reverse the dismissal. To state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, Lewis had only to allege that Toreson regarded him as substantially impaired and, for that reason, failed to hire him. See Thornhill, 866 F.2d at 1183. Construed liberally, Lewis' complaint adequately states that allegation.1
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TROTT, Circuit Judge, dissents.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for disposition without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4. Accordingly, Lewis' request for oral argument is denied
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3
The district court could have treated the FDIC's motion as one for summary judgment and disposed of it as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 had Lewis been made aware of the conversion and given a reasonable opportunity to present responsive evidence. Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 438 (9th Cir. 1984)
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
