Unpublished Disposition, 923 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1991)

MEMORANDUM^* 

Nicholas J. DeSanto appeals his conviction after a conditional plea of guilty. DeSanto challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of the trunk of his car. In addition, DeSanto challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made after refusing to sign a Miranda card and while he appeared to be under the influence of drugs.

We find no error in the district court's decision denying the motions, and accordingly affirm the judgment.

ANALYSIS

The Warrantless Search of the Trunk

We do not address DeSanto's claim that the warrantless search was illegal as a search incident to arrest. See United States v. Chimel, 395 U.S. 752, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). The search was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).

Police may conduct a warrantless search of every part of a legitimately stopped vehicle, including the trunk and all containers, if there is probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime.¹  Id.; see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). The probable cause determination must be based on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith of the police officers. Ross, 456 U.S. at 808.

This search was supported by probable cause. DeSanto, his passenger, and the car smelled of chemicals associated with methamphetamine manufacture. The passenger had a methamphetamine formula in his pocket. The officers knew the passenger had been involved in the making of methamphetamine in the past and that he was wanted on felony warrants. DeSanto had been driving the passenger toward a known "drug house."²  DeSanto gave a name but could not produce any identification. DeSanto and the passenger each had a concealed handgun within the car. The police had abundant probable cause to enter and search the vehicle, including the trunk, for evidence of a crime. The evidence obtained in the search is admissible.

Waiver of Miranda Rights

The government need prove a waiver of Miranda rights only by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986). We review the district court's finding that the defendant waived his Miranda rights under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475 (1988) (citation omitted), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1578 (1990).

An explicit statement of waiver is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived the right to remain silent. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979); United States v. Moreno-Lopez, 466 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hilliker, 436 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958 (1971). DeSanto's refusal to sign that he understood his constitutional rights does not bar a finding that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. Unlike the situation in cases DeSanto relies on, DeSanto did not refuse to sign a waiver of his Miranda rights; he merely refused to sign a form stating that he had been read and understood those rights. See Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (waiver effective even though defendant refused to sign a "waiver" card).³ 

The trier of fact must look at the surrounding circumstances to determine whether DeSanto knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 372-73. Here there was testimony that the officers informed DeSanto of his Miranda rights two, possibly three, times. On each occasion, DeSanto told the officers that he understood his rights and had no questions about them. He did not orally invoke his right to remain silent, but answered questions freely. There was no intensive or intimidating interrogation or other evidence of coercion.

DeSanto contends that one specific circumstance renders his waiver involuntary: he was under the influence of drugs. DeSanto argues that the police erred because they should have recognized that he was under the influence of drugs and was incapable of knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his rights. But DeSanto's somewhat altered mental condition, as observed and testified to by the officers, is not a basis for finding that his waiver was not made voluntarily,⁴  absent official coercion or misconduct. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165 (1986). A waiver is voluntary if it is "the product of a rational intellect and a free will" whether or not the waiver is the product of a drug-induced statement. Medeiros v. Shimoda, 889 F.2d 819, 823 (9th Cir. 1989), (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3219 (1990). The district court examined the circumstances surrounding DeSanto's statements and concluded that he was capable of making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. He was able to drive an automobile, obey the officers' orders prior to making any statements, respond to the officer's questions that he understood his rights, falsify his name, and deny prior arrests.

The government sustained its burden of demonstrating that DeSanto knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his fifth amendment right. The district court did not clearly err in denying the motions to suppress.

AFFIRMED.