Unpublished Disposition, 923 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1991)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Julius M. Engel appeals pro se the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Engel, a former Folsom Prison Correctional Officer, alleges that the defendant prison officials failed to promote him to the position of Correctional Counselor I in retaliation for exercising his first amendment free speech rights. We review de novo, Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990), and we affirm.

In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law. Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 1989). "The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial." Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir. 1989). Nevertheless, there is no genuine issue of material fact if the party opposing the motion "fail [s] to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Supervisory officials are liable under section 1983 only when (1) they are personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or (2) there exists a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). Supervisory liability exists without overt personal participation in the offensive act only if the officials "implement a policy so deficient that the policy is 'itself a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.' " Id. (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)).

The Warden of the prison is the appointing authority for all employees of the prison, but has delegated the power to interview and evaluate candidates for Correctional Counselor I to an interview panel. After interviewing the candidates, the panel recommends the best qualified candidate to the head of the department where the individual will be working, to the Chief Deputy Warden, and to the Warden.

In September 1984, Engel began work as a correctional officer at Folsom. In August 1986, he applied for and was placed on the eligible list for the position of Correctional Counselor I. In August and November 1987 and in April and June 1988, he interviewed for that position. None of the panels recommended that Engel be promoted to the position of Correctional Counselor I.

Engel asserts that he was not promoted because he had previously complained about documents placed in his personnel file. He named Warden Borg, Chief Deputy Smith, and Associate Warden Escoto as defendants in this action. Although Associate Warden Escoto was a member of the interview panel for the August 1987, November 1987, and April 1988 interviews, he disqualified himself from the interviews regarding Engel. Warden Borg and Chief Deputy Smith were not members of the interview panel, and because the interview panel did not recommend that Engel be promoted, his name was not placed before them for consideration. Because Engel raised no genuine issue of material fact to suggest that any of the prison officials named as defendants in this action were personally involved in denying him the promotion, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646.

AFFIRMED.