Unpublished Disposition, 917 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Michael Hunter ("Hunter"), appeals pro se the district court's order denying his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Hunter, a federal prisoner, was released on parole. While on parole, he was arrested and convicted of various crimes. He was then sent back to jail, and eventually released on parole again. However, while on parole he committed more crimes and subsequently returned to jail. During this repetitive jail-parole-crime-jail cycle, Hunter's parole revocation hearing was delayed. His hearing was delayed because of his numerous arrests, his required participation in a mental health program, and his own request for a continuance.

DISCUSSION

Hunter first argues that Judge Dwyer should have recused himself, because he mailed the judge a threatening letter. A judge must recuse himself in any case in which he may have a personal interest or bias. 28 U.S.C. § 455. However, a judge is not disqualified merely because a litigant threatens him. See United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939-40 (9th Cir. 1986). Apart from the fact of his threat and Judge Dwyer's knowledge of it, Hunter has failed to present any evidence of judicial bias. Thus, this claim must fail.

Hunter's claim that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing is also without merit. A court need do so only when the habeas corpus petition raises disputed questions of material fact. Solheim v. Armstrong, 859 F.2d, 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1988). In light of the numerous records of Hunter's criminal charges and convictions, Hunter's petition does not raise any disputed questions of material fact. Hunter's naked claim that he did not commit the crimes is insufficient to establish a disputed fact.

In light of the record before the district court, Hunter's assertions that the United States Parole Commission acted for the purpose of impeding his civil rights action, that the allegations of that action should have been made a part of his habeas corpus petition, that the USPC relied upon false records, and that his parole hearing has been unreasonably delayed are devoid of merit. It is quite clear that his difficulties are a result of his own deeds, rather than those of the USPC.

Finally, Hunter's demand for credit for time served should await the completion of the pending USPC proceedings. It should first be dealt with there.

AFFIRMED.