United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. William Louis Grinnell, Jr., Defendant-appellant, 915 F.2d 667 (11th Cir. 1990)

On this appeal, defendant William Louis Grinnell, Jr., raises several challenges to his criminal convictions and sentences, including a constitutional attack on the mandatory sentencing provisions found in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1), any individual convicted of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense shall be sentenced to a mandatory five-year sentence to be served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment.¹  Grinnell argues that imposition of this fixed, mandatory sentencing provision violates due process in two respects: first, he contends that the mandatory sentencing requirement deprives him of his right to receive individualized treatment at sentencing; and second, he claims that Congress' decision to impose a mandatory five-year sentence for the offense was arbitrary and capricious. For the same reasons that another panel of this court recently upheld a challenge to the 20-year mandatory sentencing provision under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), see United States v. Hamblin, 911 F.2d 551, 555-56 (11th Cir. 1990),²  we uphold Grinnell's five-year mandatory, consecutive sentence.

In the area of non-capital criminal offenses, Congress enjoys wide latitude both in defining that conduct which constitutes a criminal act and in prescribing the appropriate sentence to be imposed after judicial ascertainment of guilt. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 647, 650, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989). In assessing Congress' choice of punishment associated with any particular non-capital offense, federal court review is severely limited. Traditionally, the legislative body's choice of sentence is insulated from judicial review unless the prescribed sentence when considered in light of the proscribed conduct, is so severe as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment or is wholly lacking in a rational purpose.

A defendant who commits a non-capital offense generally has no right to receive an individualized sentence. United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376, 379 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S. Ct. 416, 107 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1989). Indeed, throughout the early years of this nation's history, most criminal offenses carried with them a mandatory, fixed term of imprisonment. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-46, 98 S. Ct. 2610, 2613, 57 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1978) (citing Report of Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing, Fair and Certain Punishment 83-85 (1976)). Thus, the fact that Congress has chosen to limit the range of permissible sentences by requiring a mandatory minimum amount of imprisonment, United States v. Solomon, 848 F.2d 156, 157 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v. Holmes, 838 F.2d 1175 (11th Cir. 1988), or by enacting a mandatory sentencing provision, United States v. Head, 755 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding 10-year mandatory sentence); Smith v. United States, 284 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1960) (upholding a 25-year mandatory sentence),³  does not violate the Constitution.

Here, Sec. 924(c) (1) requires imposition of a five-year sentence upon conviction. Although a sentencing judge might wish to impose a different sentence absent this legislative constraint, the constitution has never been interpreted to require a sentencing judge to have absolute discretion in choosing a term of incarceration. Cf. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188-90, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 2242-43, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979). Consequently, we agree that Sec. 924(c) (1) is not inherently violative of due process because it requires imposition of a mandatory sentence.⁴  United States v. Hamblin, 911 F.2d at 555. Accord United States v. Goodface, 835 F.2d 1233, 1234 (8th Cir. 1987).

Grinnell also argues that the imposition of a mandatory five-year sentence under Sec. 924(c) (1) is arbitrary or capricious. This court in Hamblin held that the 20-year mandatory sentence for a person convicted a second time of violating Sec. 924(c) (1) is not arbitrary and irrational. For the same reasons, we hold that the mandatory five-year sentence is not arbitrary or capricious. " [W]here a statute does not discriminate on racial grounds or against a suspect class, Congress' judgment will be sustained in the absence of persuasive evidence that Congress had no reasonable basis for drawing the lines that it did." Holmes, 838 F.2d at 1177. Reviewing Sec. 924(c) (1), we find that Congress had ample cause to enact the statute. It is well-recognized that the use of weapons during drug trafficking offenses and crimes of violence increases the likelihood of harm to innocent individuals and law enforcement agents. In recognition of the additional risk posed by the use of firearms during such offenses, Congress enacted Sec. 924(c) (1) as a means by which to ensure that individuals who create such additional risks to the public at large are appropriately punished. By authorizing the imposition of a fixed term of incarceration for those who use or carry a firearm during and in relation to violent crimes or drug trafficking offenses, Congress sought to provide law enforcement agents and prosecutors with an additional weapon to utilize in stemming the flow of such criminal behavior. See H.R.Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1986), 4 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1327, 1328 (July 1986). We readily conclude that the enactment of Sec. 924(c) (1)'s five-year mandatory sentencing provision is rationally related to furthering these objectives.⁵  See Holmes, 838 F.2d at 1178 ("Our responsibility is not to determine whether this was the correct judgment or whether it best accomplishes Congressional objectives; rather, our responsibility is only to determine whether Congress' judgment was rational.").

Under the controlling authority of United States v. Hamblin and for the reasons stated above, we reject Grinnell's challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). Grinnell's other claims of error are without merit and warrant no discussion. Thus, we affirm his convictions and sentences.

AFFIRMED.