David Frank Bagguley, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Max O. Cogburn, Defendant-appellee,andthomas J. Mcgraw, Defendant.david Frank Bagguley, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Richard M. Koch, Defendant-appellee, 914 F.2d 1490 (4th Cir. 1990)

David Frank Bagguley, a federal inmate, appeals from the district court's dismissal of his complaints against the Assistant United States Attorney who prosecuted him and the attorney who represented a codefendant in the criminal case. Bagguley alleged that the two attorneys were part of a conspiracy to intrude into his defense camp and to interfere with his attorney-client relationship. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.

We affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint against Assistant United States Attorney Cogburn because the issues concerning Attorney Cogburn were litigated in a previous action. The doctrine of collateral estoppel may apply to issues which were litigated in a criminal case which a party seeks to relitigate in a subsequent civil action. United States v. Wight, 839 F.2d 193, 196 (4th Cir. 1987). The allegations against Attorney Cogburn were raised and rejected by the district court in its consideration of a motion for a new trial brought pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. United States v. Bagguley, No. C-CR-85-64-02 (W.D.N.C. May 10, 1988). On appeal from that decision, this Court affirmed. United States v. Bagguley, No. 88-7123 (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 1989) (unpublished). The district court's denial of the Rule 33 motion relied upon findings that there were no improprieties on the part of the Assistant United States Attorney regarding the plea agreement with co-defendant Harp. These findings are entitled to collateral estoppel effect in this civil action. See Silverton v. Department of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981); Edwards v. Vasel, 469 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1972). We find no reason to reconsider those issues in the instant case.

We also affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint against Attorney Koch. The complaint reveals no basis for finding diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Nor is there any federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as attorney Koch is not a federal official amenable to suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Cox v. Hellerstein, 685 F.2d 1098 (9th Cir. 1982). Finally, in view of our previous holding that Cogburn's actions were not improper, Bagguley's allegations of a conspiracy between Cogburn and Koch are insufficient to justify a finding that Koch was acting under color of federal or state law. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.

AFFIRMED.