Unpublished Disposition, 911 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

John Thomas Brady, a former federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence without an evidentiary hearing. Brady contends that his guilty plea is invalid because he was incompetent at the time he entered the plea. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and review the dismissal de novo. United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1990). We reverse and remand.

A district court may deny a section 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing only if the movant's allegations, viewed against the record, either fail to state a claim for relief or are so palpably incredible or so patently frivolous or false as to warrant summary dismissal. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977); United States v. Espinoza, 866 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1989). Where, however, a prisoner's allegations of an invalid guilty plea are based on alleged occurrences outside the record, an evidentiary hearing is required. Espinoza, 866 F.2d at 1069.

Brady contends that his guilty plea is invalid because (1) he did not understand the nature of the charges against him, (2) he lacked the capability to understand the proceedings, and (3) the trial court should have ordered a psychiatric examination to determine his competency.¹  In essence, he alleges he was incompetent to plead guilty.

The trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's competence to plead guilty whenever the court has or reasonably should have a good faith doubt of the defendant's competence. Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 515 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, " [w]e review the record to see if the evidence of incompetence was such that a reasonable judge would be expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting the defendant's competence." Chavez, 656 F.2d at 515-16.

At the time Brady's guilty plea was taken, the trial judge held a Rule 11 hearing at which Brady was questioned regarding his understanding of the plea agreement and the consequences of his guilty plea. Brady recited that he understood the charges, knew the maximum sentence, acknowledged reading and signing the plea agreement, was familiar with the contents of the agreement, and recognized the criminality of his conduct. There is no indication that Brady was confused or uncertain during the proceedings; nor is there any testimony suggesting that Brady's competence was in question. In short, there was no evidence to create a doubt as to Brady's competence. See Darrow v. Gunn, 594 F.2d 767, 771 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 849 (1979).

However, even if the evidence before the trial court was insufficient to raise a good faith doubt with respect to Brady's competence, Brady would still be entitled to relief if it now appears that he was in fact incompetent. See Steinsvik v. Vinzant, 640 F.2d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1981). Brady alleges that at the time of his plea he was suffering from migraine headaches which resulted from the head injuries he received in the altercation leading to his arrest. He pleaded guilty, he claims, so that he would be transferred from the county jail to federal prison where he could receive proper medical treatment. Brady alleges that he maintained his innocence to his attorney and only pled guilty because he could not rationalize this situation and was suffering severe headaches. He also alleges that he had mental problems even before his arrest. He asserts that the parties had questions about his competence and had even scheduled a conference with the magistrate to discuss the issue.

These allegations go to matters outside the record, and if true, may justify setting aside Brady's guilty plea. Therefore, the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing on Brady's allegations. See Espinoza, 866 F.2d at 1069; Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1985).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.