Unpublished Disposition, 908 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^* 

Vita G. Webb appeals the district court's summary judgment for the Jackson County Housing Authority in Webb's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to reinstate her Section 8 housing assistance. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo and affirm.

We reject Webb's argument that she raises a material issue of fact concerning whether the Housing Authority arbitrarily and capriciously terminated her housing benefits. It is undisputed that Webb did not comply with the monthly income reporting requirement of the housing program. It is also undisputed that she received notice of the requirement. She signed documents acknowledging generally that she must comply with the Housing Authority's requirements and report, among other things, changes in her income. Although it is disputed whether Webb received written notice that she was required to make monthly income reports, it is undisputed that the Housing Authority orally advised her that she had failed to comply with the monthly income reporting requirement and gave her sixty days to cure her default. Under these circumstances, it was not arbitrary and capricious for the Housing Authority to terminate Webb's benefits.

Contrary to Webb's argument, the Housing Authority's practice of telephoning assistance recipients who have failed timely to comply with reporting requirements to remind them of their obligations (as the Housing Authority did in this case), even though the Housing Authority's administrative plan does not require such action, does not render the Housing Authority's termination of Webb's benefits arbitrary and capricious. This practice is a commendable courtesy on the part of the Housing Authority.

The Housing Authority's action in terminating Webb for failure to file monthly income reports was not arbitrary and capricious simply because the Housing Authority might also have been able to terminate Webb for fraud. Webb asserts that the Housing Authority's termination for her failure to file monthly income reports was a subterfuge for what was, in fact, a termination for Webb's fraud. Yet Webb produced no evidence that the Housing Authority's stated reason for terminating her was a subterfuge. Indeed, this subterfuge argument makes no sense in light of the Housing Authority's power to terminate on the basis of fraud as well as on the basis of failure to file monthly reports. See 24 C.F.R. Sec. 882.210(d) (3), (4) (1989) (failure to carry out a family obligation and fraud are independent grounds for termination of benefits); 24 C.F.R. Sec. 882.118(a) (1) (1989) (family obligations include supplying information that the housing authority determines to be necessary).

Webb's claim that the Housing Authority waived its right to terminate her by thoughtfully giving her sixty days to cure her default rather than immediately initiating termination procedures is frivolous.

Finally, the fact that the Housing Authority's reminder to Webb was oral rather than written did not deprive her of property without procedural due process of law. Indeed, when a housing fund recipient has not complied with a mailed written notice that she must make monthly income reports, the Housing Authority's best way to assure that notice has been received is to communicate orally with the recipient.

Webb not only received notice of the monthly income reporting requirement and an opportunity to cure her default, but she also received notice of the Housing Authority's proposed termination and a hearing on the termination issue in accordance with HUD regulations. See 24 C.F.R. Sec. 882.216(b) (1989). Therefore Webb was not deprived of property without procedural due process of law. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) (procedural due process requires notice of a proposed termination of public assistance and a pretermination hearing).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.