Unpublished Disposition, 908 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1989)

MEMORANDUM^* 

Weber, a disbarred attorney, appeals the district court's dismissals of his civil rights actions against the State Bar of California and the California Supreme Court. We affirm.

FACTS

Sherman S. Weber was a member of the State Bar of California. On March 24, 1987, Weber underwent a State Bar disciplinary hearing related to his misconduct in a probate matter. On May 14, 1987, the hearing panel unanimously recommended that Weber be disbarred.

Weber filed suit against the State Bar and various individual defendants in federal district court on March 2, 1988, alleging that the State Bar hearing violated his civil rights. On October 14, 1988, the district court granted the State Bar's motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel, relying on the dismissal of an identical action by a California state superior court.

The California Supreme Court ordered Weber disbarred on December 15, 1988, in Weber v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 492, 253 Cal. Rptr. 573, 764 P.2d 701 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1649 (1989). Weber then filed a second district court action on December 22, 1988, against the California Supreme Court and the State Bar, as well as other individual defendants. He alleged that the supreme court violated his civil rights by denying a continuance of oral argument on his petition to review the State Bar's recommendation of disbarment, and he repeated his earlier claims against the State Bar. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction on April 5, 1989.

DISCUSSION

Only the California Supreme Court has the ultimate power to disbar attorneys in California. Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 300, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153, 159-60, 368 P.2d 697, 703-04 (1962). Weber filed his first suit before the supreme court ruled on the hearing panel's recommendation of disbarment. He filed the second suit a week after the supreme Court disbarred him, and alleged that the procedures used by the supreme court and by the State Bar violated his civil rights. The California Supreme Court opinion considered his challenges to the State Bar procedures and his request for a continuance and held that they were without merit. Weber v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d at 502-505, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 578-81, 764 P.2d at 706-09.

Weber's first action in federal district court was dismissed on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel. We may consider the threshold issue of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1988). We find that the district court had no jurisdiction to rule on Weber's first challenge to the State Bar procedures, filed before the decision to disbar was final. See Giannini v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 847 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because until California Supreme Court review of bar examiners committee decision is complete, unsuccessful "applicant has no basis for any claim of deprivation under federal law because no deprivation has taken place").

Weber's subsequent suit following his disbarment also was properly dismissed. The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewable de novo. Kruso v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3801 (1990). While a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar rules, it may not review a final state court judgment in a particular case even if, as here, the complaint alleges that the state court's action was unconstitutional. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Allah v. Superior Court, 871 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1989). Weber's district court action sought to open "an extensive inquiry requiring [the district court] to sit in review of a California Supreme Court judgment. This the court is without jurisdiction to do; review of that nature may be obtained only in the United States Supreme Court." In re Rosenthal, 854 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Weber sought that review unsuccessfully; his petition for certiorari was denied on April 3, 1989.

Weber argues that the district court had jurisdiction because he practices in federal court. "A federal court may ... examine a state court disciplinary proceeding if the state court's order is offered as the basis for suspending or disbarring an attorney from practice before a federal court." MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846, 846 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969). That is not the situation here. Weber's right to practice in federal court is not in issue.

Weber claims that as a pro se litigant, he should have been allowed to amend his complaint before dismissal. A pro se litigant in a civil rights case must be allowed to amend his or her complaint unless it is "absolutely clear" that changes would be futile. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). " [B]efore dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the district court must give the plaintiff a statement of the complaint's deficiencies." Id. at 623-24.

No amendments Weber might have made would have conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the district court. His constitutional claims are "inextricably intertwined with the state court's [action] in a judicial proceeding," and as such are outside the district court's jurisdiction. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16.

Further, Weber is not entitled to the special treatment due pro se litigants. As an attorney, he cannot claim automatically to fit the description this court has given of the individual who proceeds without counsel: "Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to making errors in pleading than the person who benefits from the representation of counsel." Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). Weber's complaints and subsequent pleadings may be unskilled, but he cannot blame their insufficiency on the lack of a legal education. He was disbarred because of knowing misconduct and acts of moral turpitude and dishonesty, Weber v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d at 508, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 582-33, 764 P.2d at 710-11, not because he was incompetent to practice law.

CONCLUSION

Because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we AFFIRM the dismissals of Weber's civil rights actions.