Unpublished Disposition, 908 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

James Forrester appeals the district court's entry of judgment on the pleadings in his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court found that his claims of illegal arrest, excessive use of force, and abuse of process are barred by the statute of limitations, and that his malicious prosecution claim is not cognizable under Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1981). We reverse and remand.

Forrester's complaint was filed more than one year after the events giving rising to the claims arose, but within one year of the termination of criminal proceedings against him. After the district court's decision in this case, we held in Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1989) that the tolling rule set forth in Cal.Gov't Code Sec. 945.3 tolls the one-year statute of limitations for section 1983 actions. Harding controls this case and requires reversal of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims as time barred.

The district court dismissed Forrester's malicious prosecution claim because no facts were alleged indicating that he was subjected to an intentional denial of equal protection or constitutional rights. Plaintiff's complaint does not allege a conspiracy to deny him a fair trial, cf. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985); Cline, 661 F.2d 108, nor does deprivation of employment elevate his malicious prosecution claim to a constitutional violation absent some denial of due process. Cf. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1985). While his complaint was therefore properly dismissed, we cannot say that there are no circumstances under which it could not be amended to state a claim. Leave to amend should have been given.

Given reversal of the judgment dismissing the federal claims, the basis upon which the court dismissed the pendent claims no longer remains.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.