Unpublished Disposition, 902 F.2d 1580 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Appellant John Arthur Junot ("Junot") appeals his conviction after a bench trial on one count of interfering with Secret Service agents engaged in their protective functions [18 U.S.C. § 3056(d) ] and one count of engaging in disorderly conduct in an area where the Secret Service was protecting then Vice President George Bush [18 U.S.C. § 1752(a) (2) ]. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

FACTS

On November 6, 1988, two days before the 1988 presidential election, United States Secret Service agents and Los Angeles Police Department personnel posted Warner Rich Park in Woodland Hills to secure the park for a rally to be held to support the candidacy of then Vice President George Bush for the office of President of the United States. At approximately 10:30 a.m. the same day, Junot arrived at the park carrying a silver-colored starter pistol that he had loaded with blanks. The pistol resembled a real gun. Just prior to the Vice President's entrance onto the stage, Junot pushed his way to the front of the crowd. He nervously weaved back and forth, holding a political poster in front of his waist to conceal the gun. While handling the gun, he dropped it on the ground.

A bystander next to Junot nudged him and informed him that he had dropped the gun. Then, realizing what she had said, she waived and called to nearby police officers. Junot quickly left and walked west towards Topanga Canyon. As he walked away he took off his jacket, hoping not to be recognized. The police broadcast a description of Junot. In a matter of minutes he was under arrest.

The arresting officers advised Junot of his rights, which he knowingly and voluntarily waived. He asked the agents if they had seen the gun and told them it was a starter pistol. After emptying his pockets, Junot produced a notebook with a note inside reading: "1. Buy starter, 2. ph. Bush headquarters." The notebook also contained the phone numbers for various press organizations.

After obtaining Junot's consent, the agents searched his car and apartment. The agents found an empty box for a Precise .880 Athletic Starter Revolver in the car, along with a bible with the center pages cut out. Junot told the agents he had planned to put the pistol in the bible, but that it would not fit.

He also told the agents that he had planned to do "this" three weeks earlier. In an interview with a psychotherapist, Junot stated that he intended to "get close to Bush and fire the pistol." His purpose was to demonstrate the Vice President's vulnerability and to emphasize Vice President-elect Dan Quayle's "inadequacies."

Junot was convicted on both counts. In his appeal he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.

DISCUSSION

18 U.S.C. § 3056(d) provides that:

Whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs, resists, or interferes with a Federal law enforcement agent engaged in the performance of the protective functions authorized by this section or by section 1752 of this title shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

Junot concedes he intended to fire the starter gun during the rally, and that if he had done so this would have interfered with Secret Service officers in the performance of their protective functions under section 3056(d). He argues, however, that he did not do what he intended. Instead, he dropped the gun and left the crowd. He contends that because he did not interfere with the Secret Service's duties as he had intended to, he is not guilty. In essence, Junot argues he is entitled to be acquitted because he did not violate the statute in the precise manner he intended to violate it. His argument is meritless.

Violating a statute in a manner different than originally intended implicates causation, not intent. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law Secs. 3.5(c), 3.12(f) (1986). To hold Junot liable, " 'it must be determined that any variation between the result intended ... and the result actually achieved is not so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold [him] responsible for the actual result." United States v. Spinney, 795 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law Sec. 35, at 246 (1972)). Junot intended to commit an act which would interfere with the Secret Service agents' protective functions. He intended to stage a mock assassination of the Vice President. To stage this event he brought a starter pistol to the campaign rally. Junot reasonably foresaw that he might be discovered with the gun before he could fire it. Indeed, he had thought about an alibi for having the gun in such an eventuality. Thus, it was not unexpected nor extraordinary that Junot would be discovered with the gun before carrying out his original plan.

Nor was it unexpected that were the gun discovered, it would cause a disruption and interfere with the ongoing protective duties of the Secret Service. Junot argues the intervening act of a third party, the lady who sounded the alarm, caused the interference. We disagree. This act did not break the chain of causation. It was foreseeable that anyone noticing the gun would react in a manner to alert officers at the rally, and this would disrupt the protective functions of the Secret Service. This is what happened. The result was not so "extraordinary" that it is "unfair" to hold Junot responsible for it. We therefore uphold the district court's finding of guilt on Count I.

18 U.S.C. § 1752(a) (2) provides that it is unlawful:

with intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, to engage in disorderly or disruptive conduct in, or within such proximity to, any building or grounds designated [as an area where the President or other person protected by the Secret Service is or will be temporarily visiting] when, or so that, such conduct, in fact, impedes or disrupts the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions....

As to Count II, Junot contends his conduct falls outside the scope of section 1752(a) (2) because he did not impede or disrupt "Government business or official functions." If he disrupted anything, says Junot, it was only a political rally, not government business or an official function. We reject this argument. It is irrelevant whether the campaign rally was government business or an official function. Any event at which the Secret Service is responsible for protecting the Vice President necessarily takes on the character of an official function. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a). We thus affirm the district court's finding of guilt on Count II.

AFFIRMED.