Unpublished Disposition, 902 F.2d 1578 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^* 

Duane Darling appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Ryder Truck Rental in his action for breach of contract, age discrimination, and defamation. We affirm.

We find that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Ryder impliedly agreed that Darling, manager of Ryder's Seattle district, could be terminated only for good cause. The general rule in Washington is that employment contracts are terminable at will. Ryder's current employment manual, which Darling received and signed, emphasizes that rule by specifically disclaiming good cause contracts. Thus, the manual does not create the kind of "atmosphere of job security" which might modify the general rule. See Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash.1984). Outside of the employment manual, Darling points to no evidence in the record of any representations by Ryder to Darling amounting to promises of specific treatment in specific situations. See Adler v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 765 P.2d 910, 912 (Wash.App.1988) (trial court erred in failing to determine whether evidence outside of the employment manual amounted to specific representations by the employer to the employee that discharge would be for good cause only).

We also find that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Ryder's alleged breach of its written contract to pay Darling $215,000 for his Texas house. Both Darling and Ryder compromised their legal rights to seek judicial review of the dispute by agreeing to arbitrate it. The arbitrator performed the arbitration agreement by reviewing the problem and concluding that Ryder should pay Darling only $205,000 for the house. Ryder paid Darling $205,000, which Darling accepted. These undisputed facts show an accord and satisfaction regarding this dispute. See Perez v. Pappas, 659 P.2d 475, 480 (Wash.1983) (accord and satisfaction consists of a bona fide dispute, an agreement supported by consideration to settle that dispute, and performance of that agreement).

We reject Darling's argument that Ryder violated its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Washington has not adopted the implied covenant in the termination of employment context. See Thompson, 685 P.2d at 1086; Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 748 P.2d 621, 624-25 (Wash.1988). We also reject Darling's age discrimination claim because he showed no evidence that Ryder's articulated reasons for terminating him were a mere pretext for what was, in fact, a discriminatory purpose. See Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, Inc., 753 P.2d 517, 521 (Wash.1988).

Finally, we reject Darling's contention that Ryder defamed him when it terminated him, in part,¹  for failing to repay Ryder for certain expenses Ryder paid for moving his sailboat from Texas to Washington. It is undisputed that Darling did in fact fail to repay those expenses, which Ryder originally disapproved and which Darling deleted in a revised moving expense report. Darling's failure to do so constituted financial impropriety under Ryder's policy of paying only for approved moving expenses. Ryder's statement regarding this financial impropriety of Darling was true and not actionable as defamation.

AFFIRMED.