Unpublished Disposition, 900 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1990)

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 900 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1990)

Frank W. STAMOS; Lorna D. Stamos, Petitioners-Appellants,v.UNITED STATES of America; Dennis S. Brown, Revenue Officer,Internal Revenue Service, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 88-15273.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 16, 1990.* Decided April 6, 1990.

Before CHAMBERS, WIGGINS and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM** 

Frank W. Stamos appeals the district court's denial of his motion to quash a summons issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602 and the attorney's fees awarded against him for bringing that motion. The United States seeks attorney's fees for this appeal. We have jurisdiction of appellant's timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).

* Stamos claims that a summons issued pursuant to section 7602 may be issued only in connection with a tax liability involving alcohol, tobacco, firearms or explosives. Because appellant is involved in no such activity, appellant contends the summons issued against him pursuant to the authority of 26 U.S.C. § 7602 was invalid. We review such a claim de novo. Harris v. Internal Revenue Service, 758 F.2d 456, 457 (9th Cir. 1985) (implying a de novo standard). Stamos is incorrect. No such restriction exists on a section 7602 summons. See, e.g., id. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Stamos' motion to quash the summons.

Stamos also contests the district court's award of attorney's fees against him. We review the appropriateness of a district court's grant of attorney's fees for abuse of discretion. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986).

We find appellant's contention that a section 7602 summons may only issue for tax activities in connection with alcohol, tobacco, firearms or explosives was a frivolous pleading sanctionable under Rule 11. Because even the most cursory examination of the language of section 7602 and applicable caselaw would have revealed no such limitation and Stamos did not even attempt to make an argument for reversal of that rule, appellant did not have a "good faith argument" for his assertions, as required by Rule 11. See id. at 830-31. Attorney's fees are an appropriate sanction. We therefore affirm the district court's imposition of attorney's fees.

Appellee seeks double fees and costs for services for this appeal. We have discretion to impose appellate sanctions. Fed. R. App. P. 38. Because appellant has made no effort to demonstrate error in the district court's decision, we award the government sanctions in the amount of double costs and $500 for this appeal.

II

We AFFIRM the district court's denial of the motion to quash and imposition of costs and fees. We award double costs and $500 for this appeal.

 *

The panel finds this case appropriate for submission without argument pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and 9th Cir.R. 34-4

 **

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

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