Unpublished Disposition, 898 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^* 

An administrative law judge (ALJ) held Jay Schoen's alcohol use was not disabling prior to March 31, 1982, the last date Schoen met the special earnings requirement for Title II benefits, and the district court concluded the ALJ's finding was supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Schoen raises two issues on appeal. First, relying on Kellar v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1988), and Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1987), Schoen argues that after he presented evidence of alcohol abuse, the burden shifted to the Secretary to show that Schoen could control his drinking voluntarily and that the ALJ's failure to make specific findings regarding his ability to control his drinking voluntarily was error. Second, he argues the ALJ failed to apply Social Security Ruling 83-20 to determine the date of onset of his disability.

* We have recently considered and rejected Schoen's argument based on Kellar and Cooper. Clem v. Sullivan, slip op. at 651, 655-58 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 1990). "We conclude that Cooper cannot be read to alter the claimant's initial burden of proof in a disability case.... [In Kellar ] we conceived of the claimant's burden as requiring, under all circumstances, a showing that he could not do his previous work." Id. at 657-58. Thus, Schoen has the initial burden of showing he is disabled and meets this burden by showing he cannot perform his previous occupation. Id. at 655.

To meet this burden, Schoen testified concerning his alcohol abuse and other information and introduced a range of supporting medical evidence.

Schoen testified he started drinking excessively in 1966. Thereafter he held no job for more than three months and his last period of employment was as a hotel maintenance person during 1980. He claimed his last two periods of employment ended as a result of his alcohol abuse. For the two to three years prior to 1982, Schoen claimed he lived as a "street drunk."

Records from a hospital stay in 1979 reflected elevated liver enzymes and urinary retention. A subsequent hospital report in the same year indicated Schoen was suffering from alcohol abuse and cirrhosis. He was admitted to an alcoholism treatment facility once in 1975, twice in 1977, and once in 1981. He was admitted to the treatment program four times in the two months following the cutoff date and four times in 1983.

The ALJ found Schoen's hearing testimony "did not seem sincere" and was not substantiated by objective medical evidence of chronic alcoholism at or before the cutoff date. Testing near the cutoff date showed levels of bilirubin and albumin insufficient to meet the requirements of Listing 5.05(D) & (F).

Because he disbelieved Schoen's testimony and because of the absence of objective documentation of treatment, the ALJ found Schoen's alcoholism resulted in only a slight restriction in his activities. The ALJ concluded that Schoen retained the residual functional capacity to perform his prior work as a thrift store manager, security guard, and combine operator.

While Schoen's medical evidence and pattern of treatment immediately after the cutoff date might have supported an inference of disabling alcoholism before the cutoff date, the ALJ was not required to draw such an inference. "When there is evidence sufficient to support either outcome, we must affirm the decision actually made." Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).

Since the record supports the ALJ's finding Schoen did not meet his initial burden of proving disability, the ALJ did not err by failing to make specific findings as to Schoen's ability to control his alcohol use. For the same reason we also reject Schoen's argument that the ALJ failed to properly apply Social Security Ruling 83-20 in determining the date of onset of disability. Because Schoen did not meet his initial burden of proving he was disabled from performing his prior work, it was unnecessary to determine the onset date of Schoen's alcoholism and SSR 83-20 was not relevant.

AFFIRMED.