Unpublished Disposition, 898 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Henderson Duval Houghton appeals from the order dismissing this matter after summary judgment was granted in favor of Glenn Osborne and Frank Tuss. Houghton alleged in his amended complaint that Osborne, the Sheriff of Cascade County, and Tuss, the Chief Jailor of the Cascade County Jail, deprived him of his rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, to due process, and to equal protection of the laws, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by requiring him to appear in orange prison coveralls at a mental competency hearing, a criminal proceeding against his son, and at a psychiatrist's office.

We review de novo an order granting a motion for summary judgment. Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989). Assuming the facts are as alleged by Houghton, we must decide whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Judie v. Hamilton, 872 F.2d 919, 920 (9th Cir. 1989). We affirm because we conclude that the facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to Houghton, would entitle Osborne and Tuss to a judgment as a matter of law.

* Houghton contends that requiring him to appear in prison clothes at a competency proceeding or while being transported outside of the county jail in public view constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Houghton has not cited any authority to support this contention. Instead, he claims that requiring a prisoner to wear identifiable prison clothes under these circumstances violates the Supreme Court's characterization of cruel and unusual punishment as governmental conduct that is incompatible with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).

The record shows that the policy of requiring pretrial detainees to wear orange coveralls when transported outside the county jail for purposes other than to appear in a jury trial was necessary for sanitation, to prevent smuggling, to reduce escape attempts, and to facilitate recapture. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Supreme Court instructed as follows:

Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial.

Id. at 540. The requirement that a pretrial detainee wear jail coveralls to reduce health hazards caused by unclean or contaminated clothing, to curtail the smuggling of contraband into the jail, and to prevent escape is reasonably related to valid institutional interests. Houghton failed to demonstrate that this restraint was cruel and unusual punishment.

II

Houghton argues that the jail clothing policy violated his right to due process. He also asserts that appellees failed to demonstrate "that a need exists to require the wearing of a jail uniform outside the jail." Appellant's Opening Brief at 18. As discussed above, the record shows that the requirement that pretrial detainees wear orange coveralls outside the jail was necessary to prevent escapes and to curtail smuggling.

Houghton cites Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), in support of his due process claim. In Estelle, the Supreme Court ruled that a requirement that an accused wear identifiable prison clothing in the presence of a jury violated due process because of its possible prejudicial impact on the jury's verdict. Id. at 504-05. No showing has been made that the jail clothing policy had any impact on the fairness of the nonjury pretrial competency proceeding. The facts construed in the light most favorable to Houghton support the district court's determination that he was not deprived of due process.

III

Houghton amended his complaint to include an allegation of a deprivation of his right to equal protection. This contention has apparently been abandoned. There is no reference in Houghton's list of issues on appeal to a deprivation of equal protection. Appellant's Opening Brief at 9. There is no discussion of this theory nor any citation to applicable authority. Accordingly, we decline to reach this issue.

IV

Houghton also complains that the court granted appellees' motion for a summary judgment prior to ruling on his motion to compel answers to admissions and interrogatories. We need not resolve this issue because we have construed any relevant facts alleged in Houghton's amended complaint as uncontested and have accepted them in the light most favorable to Houghton.

AFFIRMED.