Unpublished Disposition, 883 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1984)

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US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 883 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1984)

Maria A. LANGI, individually and as Administrator of theEstate of Laszlo Z. Langi, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, BechtelPower Corporation, a corporation, and Does 1through 50, inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 88-2592.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 29, 1989.* Decided Aug. 15, 1989.

Eugene F. Lynch, District Judge, Presiding.

Before WALLACE, POOLE, and CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM

Maria Langi appeals individually and as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, Laszlo Langi, from a summary judgment entered on behalf of Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel) and from a judgment in favor of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan) after a bench trial. The single issue raised is whether Bechtel and Metropolitan "fulfilled their duties under ERISA in failing to make [Laszlo] aware of his rights" under a group life insurance policy. The district court had jurisdiction under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

In reviewing the summary judgment independently (de novo), Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1986), we conclude that the district court correctly determined "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact with regard to BECHTEL'S alleged breach of its fiduciary duties and denial of benefits under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, and that BECHTEL is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In addition, we conclude that there is no reason to reverse the determination by the district court after trial that Metropolitan violated any fiduciary duty owed to Laszlo.

It is undisputed that Sedie, Bechtel's personnel benefits administrator, met with Laszlo and specifically informed him of his right to convert his group life insurance policy to an individual policy. Bechtel also introduced a sheet entitled "Benefit Rights When Terminating Employment" that included a statement signed by Laszlo in which he acknowledged that he had the right to convert his group coverage to individual coverage within a specified time, without the need for a medical examination. Laszlo had at least a working understanding of English.

It is undisputed that Laszlo did not exercise his right to convert the group insurance on his life to individual coverage. Thus, at the time of his death on October 5, 1984, Laszlo was insured only under the policy for $10,000.00, which sum, plus accrued interest, was promptly paid to Maria by Metropolitan.

Nevertheless, Maria maintains that she is entitled to the proceeds ($71,000.00) of the group life insurance alleging that Metropolitan breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA because Laszlo "was treated in the same manner as all retiring or terminating Bechtel employees." If we were to require individual treatment of each employee, it would be difficult to fault the efforts made in this case to be sure Laszlo understood his rights under the group insurance policy. But we need not do so.

In Stahl v. Tony's Building Materials, Inc., 875 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1989), plaintiff brought suit alleging that the defendants, plaintiff's employer, the pension trust fund, and the insurance underwriter had breached their fiduciary duty by failing to warn him that he could lose his past service credits if he continued to work after expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1406. We held that the defendants had explained adequately the past service credits rule in the summary plan description. Id. at 1408-09. Importantly, we stated that "the Trust Fund's fiduciary duties [did not require] it to provide any individualized notice to Stahl." Id. at 1409.

In light of Stahl, it is clear that no fiduciary duty was breached by Bechtel or Metropolitan.

AFFIRMED.

 *

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4

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