Unpublished Disposition, 881 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1989)

MEMORANDUM^** 

The question on appeal is whether there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the Secretary's conclusion that appellant was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity" by reason of physical or mental impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1) (a). While part-time work may qualify as "substantial gainful activity," see Robertson v. Heckler, 716 F.2d 1284, 1285 (9th Cir. 1983), we have held that " ' [t]he ability to work only a few hours a day or to work only on an intermittent basis is not the ability to engage in "substantial gainful activity." ' " Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). Recently, we held that a claimant who could work a maximum of four hours a day was not capable of substantially gainful activity for purposes of the Act. See Rodriguez v. Bowen, No. 87-2719 (9th Cir. May 30, 1989).

On the record before us, we cannot determine how many hours a day appellant is capable of working. Accordingly, we reverse with instruction to remand for a determination by the Secretary on this question.

REVERSED.