Unpublished Disposition, 881 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1987)

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US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 881 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1987)

Frederick H. FISHER, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Dwayne DURHAM, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 88-15144.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted*  June 26, 1989.Decided Aug. 3, 1989.

Before TANG, REINHARDT and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM** 

Appellant Fredrick Fisher filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that he had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and denied due process of law. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Fisher timely appealed, and we affirm.

* Fisher was incarcerated in the Pima County Adult Detention Center in Tucson, Arizona awaiting trial. On January 22, 1987, Fisher was admitted to the facility and assigned to general population. During the approximately 10 months appellant spent in the Pima County Jail, appellant's status changed several times. At various points, Fisher was placed in administrative segregation and even in isolation. Appellant was also, for a brief period, subjected to other restrictive conditions, such as confinement in cuffs while out of cell. During the periods of removal from general population, appellant's status was subject to weekly administrative review hearings. In November, Fisher pled guilty and was sentenced. He was subsequently transferred to a different facility to complete his sentence.

Fisher claims that the conditions of confinement were unconstitutional for three reasons. First, appellant contends that his removal from general population was without due process of law. Second, he argues that while he was in administrative segregation he was denied access to reasonable library facilities. Third, Fisher claims that he was kept in administrative segregation and isolation because the defendants were prejudiced against him because he is white, and also as punishment for writing grievances and helping other inmates to write grievances. We find each claim to be without merit.

1. Fisher claims that the limited access to reading material and a ban against xeroxing material was unconstitutional. However, such claims do not allege facts that rise to the level of a constitutional violation. While an inmate may not be denied access to the courts, Fisher has not alleged that his inability to check out all the books he wanted interfered with his legal defense. Moreover, we do not believe that denial of xeroxed materials amount to a constitutional violation.

2. Fisher has not alleged facts amounting to a due process violation in connection with the changes in his prison confinements. The due process required before an inmate can be placed in administrative segregation is a "nonadversary review of the information supporting administrative confinement, including whatever statement [the prisoner] cared to submit, within a reasonable time after confining him to administrative segregation." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1982). Fisher was regularly provided with hearings.

3. Finally, appellant contends that the conditions of his confinement were punitive and retaliatory. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1972). Appellees respond that the conditions of confinement were in response to legitimate security needs of the institution; "if a particular condition or restriction imposed on pretrial detainee is reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to punishment." Id. at 539.

Here, in support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants stated, by way of affidavits, that Fisher was placed in administrative segregation for legitimate institutional reasons, i.e. security and discipline. Attached to the defendants' report was evidence that they had justification for sending Fisher to administrative segregation, including numerous reports from various officials that Fisher had been threatened, that he was threatening others, and that his behavior was disruptive. Since the moving party properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifted to the nonmoving party to go beyond its pleadings and to set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(e); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Thus, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, Fisher was required to show that there was a genuine issue as to whether any of the conditions were imposed for illegitimate purposes.

Fisher filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment which included his own unsworn conclusory statement and some exhibits which failed to provide any support for his contention that the prison had imposed administrative segregation due to racism or as punishment for writing grievances. Conclusory statements are insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984). Thus, the district court's grant of summary judgment was proper.

AFFIRMED.

 *

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Circuit Rule 34-4

 **

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3

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