Unpublished Disposition, 878 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Lawrence Lee Engel appeals pro se from the district court's dismissal of his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Engel alleges that Clark County violated his constitutional rights by denying him a building permit. He contends that the district court erred in dismissing his action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

ANALYSIS

The issue presented by this appeal is one of law which this court reviews de novo. Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1442 (9th Cir. 1986). We may affirm the district court on any ground supported by the record, even if the district court relied on different reasons. Big Spring v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 767 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1181 (1986).

The question of ripeness goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court. Shelter Creek Development Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 134 (1988). In actions involving land use disputes, "the doctrine of ripeness is intended to avoid premature adjudication or review of administrative action." Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1557 (1989). Constitutional challenges of land use decisions are ripe for review when the aggrieved party has received the planning commission's "final definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question." MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351 (1986) (quoting Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985)).

We have held the "final decision" requirement applicable to procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and regulatory taking claims brought to challenge the application of land use regulations. See Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing cases). The aggrieved property owner has a "high burden of proving that a final decision has been reached by the agency before it may seek compensatory or injunctive relief in federal court on federal constitutional grounds." Id. at 533.

We are unable to discern from the record whether "the end of the road was reached" by the parties to this action. Id. at 535. Because appellant has failed to demonstrate that the requisite "final decision" has been obtained, he has not shown that his case is ripe for review by a federal court.

AFFIRMED.