Unpublished Disposition, 863 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^** 

G. Donald Massey appeals the district court's denial of his motion for a temporary restraining order. The district court denied the motion because Massey did not demonstrate entitlement to relief or even allege a basis for federal jurisdiction. We affirm.

The district court properly found that it lacked jurisdiction over Massey's complaint. The complaint alleges common law trespass. Massey alleges jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1852, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 30 U.S.C. §§ 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, and 53. 18 U.S.C. § 1852 is a criminal statute prohibiting destruction and removal of timber from public lands. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants jurisdiction to federal district courts in all civil actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." The other provisions cited in Massey's complaint govern mineral claims on federal land. None of these provisions confers jurisdiction on federal courts over trespass actions brought by persons with claims to mineral rights on federal lands.

Massey's claim to jurisdiction is apparently based on his belief that he has rights in property by operation of federal mineral laws. The fact that title to land which is the subject of a dispute is traceable to federal law, is not enough to establish federal question jurisdiction. Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 249 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912)). See also Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571 (1900).

Because the district court had no jurisdiction over Massey's complaint, Massey's motion for a Temporary Restraining Order was properly denied. AFFIRMED.