Unpublished Disposition, 845 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^** 

The Alcalas, debtors in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, seek reversal of the district court's affirmance of an order of the bankruptcy court. That order denied the Alcalas' motion to confirm abandoned property and granted the bankruptcy trustee's motion for an order authorizing compromise. We affirm the district court's order.

The Alcalas first argue that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over their claims for "wrongful forcing into bankruptcy" and emotional distress because the claims arose after their bankruptcy petition. The Alcalas offer no real support for their contention. The events from which their damages arose, certain alleged breaches of contract and fraud, occurred before their Chapter 7 petition was filed. Therefore, the causes of action accrued pre-petition and are part of the estate vested in the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2) (1982).

We need not address the Alcalas' arguments based on section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act and the cases construing it, except to note that the Bankruptcy Act had already been superseded by the Bankruptcy Code when the petition in this case was filed. The Act has no bearing on this case. Moreover, contrary to the Alcalas' assertion, their prospective advantage claim does not come within the ambit of the future earnings exception to estate property embodied in the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (6). The claim does not constitute "earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case." Id. In fact, the Alcalas nowhere assert that they performed any such services.

The Alcalas' second argument is that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in failing to abstain while the state court determined their capacity to sue and the transferability of their causes of action. We can discern no reason that the bankruptcy court should have abstained. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (2) does not require abstention here because the estate's ownership of the debtor's property is an issue that arises under Title 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. The Alcalas' other contention, that the state court should have been allowed to determine the assignability of the causes of action, also has no merit. As we have held, the assignability under state law of causes of action is no longer an issue in determining whether property is to be included in the estate. Sierra Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 789 F.2d 705, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1986) (construing 11 U.S.C. § 541). Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in failing to abstain pending a state court decision on assignability.

Having found no merit in any of appellants' arguments, we affirm with costs to appellee.

AFFIRMED.