Unpublished Disposition, 842 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM

Cordova appeals from a summary judgment in his contract claim entered in favor of Paradyne Corporation, his former employer. The district court had jurisdiction over this diversity action, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the ruling by the district court de novo. Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1984). We reverse and remand.

In holding that the contract did not provide for payment of Cordova's salary for the entire year, the district judge "found that the contract terms are clear and unambiguous and preclude the admission of contradictory extrinsic evidence." Order and Judgment, p. 2. Thus, the district judge refused to consider Cordova's proffered evidence of a meaning different from the express language of the contract.

California law governs the issue before us. Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 1980). Under California law, the district judge was required to consider the extrinsic evidence offered to explain the meaning of the written instrument. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 37, 442 P.2d 641, 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564 (1968). The interpreting judge may not neglect to do so because he or she believes the contract is plain and unambiguous. Id.

Under California law, the district judge should have considered the proffered extrinsic evidence to determine if it supports the asserted interpretation. We need not reach the other issues presented by Cordova.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.