Unpublished Disposition, 841 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1988)
Annotate this CaseBilly Joe BIDWELL, Petitioner-Appellant,v.Peter M. CARLSON, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 87-1713.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 25, 1987.* Decided Feb. 29, 1988.
Before KILKENNY, CANBY and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM**
Bidwell is a federal prisoner who appeals pro se the district court's denial of his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We review de novo, see Walker v. United States, 816 F.2d 1313, 1316 (CA9 1987) (per curiam); but see United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-1202 (CA9) (in banc) (weighing de novo and clearly erroneous standards of review where mixed questions of law and fact involved), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984), and Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 561 (CA9 1987) (same with respect to petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254), and we affirm.
As the result of a felony drug conviction in 1976, Bidwell was sentenced in federal district court to concurrent eight-year terms of imprisonment and a subsequent special parole term of three years. Paroled in 1980, Bidwell was convicted in state court the following year of a drug-related kidnapping. Because of this second conviction, Bidwell's federal parole was revoked and he was returned to federal prison in 1985 to serve the balance of his original sentence.
Bidwell contends that he was denied due process when credit for his jail time, statutory and extra good time, and Community Treatment Center time, all of which had accumulated prior to his release in 1980, was allegedly forfeited upon his reincarceration.1
Bidwell's contention with respect to good time credits lacks merit. Once a prisoner is reincarcerated for parole violation, he can be deprived of any and all good time credits previously amassed. Raines v. United States Parole Comm'n, 829 F.2d 840, 844 (CA9 1987) (per curiam). This applies to extra good time credits as well. See Thompson v. Lacey, 817 F.2d 1315, 1317 (CA8 1987) (per curiam). Thus, while Bidwell is entitled to begin accumulating good time credits again, see Mandel v. Heritage, 267 F.2d 852, 853 (CA9 1959) (per curiam), those credits accumulated prior to his release do not carry forward. Id. See also 28 C.F.R. Sec. 523.17 (1987).
Bidwell's contention with respect to his jail time credit is also without merit. Unlike good time credit, which merely reduces the amount of time that an inmate must spend within a prison's walls, see Raines, 829 F.2d at 844, jail time credit reduces the actual length of the prison term itself. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). See also United States v. Johnson, 801 F.2d 597, 600 (CA2 1986) (time incarcerated as pretrial detainee counts toward sentence imposed). Jail time credit is therefore "credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment [.]" 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). See also S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 128-29, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3311-12 (noting similarity between former 18 U.S.C. § 3568 and section 3585).
Although the Sentence Monitoring Computation Data sheet ("sheet") appears to indicate that Bidwell was not credited with jail time when his sentence was recalculated following the revocation of his parole, a careful review of the dates set forth in the sheet and in Bidwell's own Statement of Facts below reveals that he received full credit for his jail time, and that this credited time was carried forward.2 The district court did not err on this point.
The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
The panel unanimously agrees that this case is appropriate for submission without oral argument per FRAP 34(a) and CA9 Rule 34-4
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this Circuit except as provided by CA9 Rule 36-3
More precisely, Bidwell argues that the warden acted ultra vires by imposing a new sentence. Bidwell's mischaracterization of the issue is the result of his understandable misreading of the Sentence Monitoring Computation Data sheet, which refers to a "new sentence imposed." In point of fact, however, "new sentence" simply refers to that portion of Bidwell's original sentence that remained unserved upon his release on parole in 1980
Bidwell's Statement of Facts (CR 2 at 3) and the exhibit attached thereto (CR 2, Ex. A at 4) show that he was sentenced on his federal conviction on June 29, 1976, credited with 144 days' jail time, and, following his release on parole, convicted on state charges on July 30, 1981. He remained in state custody until June 25, 1985, after which he began serving the remainder of his federal sentence. Excluding the "state time" (July 30, 1981 to June 25, 1985) and granting 144 days' jail time credit, Bidwell's full term on the original sentence would not expire until late 1990
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