Louis J. Lane, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Central Bank of Alabama, N.a., Defendant-appellee, 756 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1985)

Louis J. Lane ("Lane") appeals from a decision of the district court awarding summary judgment to appellee Central Bank of Alabama ("Central"). The district court held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear claims arising under the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1). Accordingly, Lane's claim was deemed barred by res judicata since Lane failed to assert the federal claim in a prior state court action involving the same facts relied upon by Lane in the district court. We affirm.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly held that its jurisdiction under the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act was concurrent with that of the state courts. Our analysis "begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction." Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478, 101 S. Ct. 2870, 2875, 69 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1981). This presumption "can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests." Id.¹ 

Gulf Offshore requires that we examine the provision in question for an "explicit statutory directive" mandating exclusive federal jurisdiction. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478, 101 S. Ct. at 2875. The jurisdictional section accompanying the Bank Holding Company Act states:

Any person who is injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in Sec. 1972 of this Title may sue therefore in any district court of the United States in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without regard to the amount in controversy, and shall be entitled to recover three times the amount of the damages sustained by him, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

12 U.S.C. § 1975. The district court correctly noted that use of the permissive term "may" is entirely consistent with the presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 82 S. Ct. 519, 7 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1962) (Labor Management Relations Act held not to confer exclusive federal jurisdiction); Greene v. County School Board of Henrico County, Va., 524 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Va. 1981) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 held not to confer exclusive federal jurisdiction); Ted's Tire Service, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 470 F. Supp. 163 (D. Conn. 1979) (Petroleum Marketing Practices Act held not to confer exclusive federal jurisdiction); Burrell v. Turner Corp. of Oklahoma, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 held not to confer exclusive federal court jurisdiction). In short, we find no explicit statutory directive evincing a congressional desire to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts.² 

Similarly, our review of the legislative history reveals no "unmistakable implication" that Congress intended to confine jurisdiction to the federal courts. See S.Rep. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.; Conf.Rep. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5519 et seq.; see also 116 Cong.Rec. S15707 et seq. (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1970). Lane points to a statement in the legislative history by Assistant Attorney General Richard McLaren to the effect that the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act would provide a "valuable supplement" to the antitrust laws. See 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5519, 5559. From this, Lane argues that Congress was well aware that the antitrust laws were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, see Blumenstock Bros. Ad. Agency v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440, 40 S. Ct. 385, 386, 64 L. Ed. 649 (1920), and concludes that the Bank Holding Company Act is also within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. As noted above,³  however, Congress specifically defined "antitrust laws," and the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act were not included in that definition. See 15 U.S.C. § 12. Given this fact, we conclude that the legislative history's reference to the anti-tying provisions as a "supplement" to the antitrust laws is simply insufficient to provide the "unmistakeable implication" needed to rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.

Finally, Lane argues that there is a "clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests." Gulf Offshore, supra, 453 U.S. at 478, 101 S. Ct. at 2875. To support this argument, Lane notes that he was, in large part, prevented from proving his case in the prior state court action due to the operation of Alabama's "Dead Man's Statute." See Ala.Code Sec. 12-21-163 (1975). Because of this statute, Lane argues that it is grossly unfair for a resident of one state to receive a favorable interpretation of federal law from his state court while a resident of another state receives a contrary analysis of the same federal right from his state court. If, however, differing state evidentiary rules were sufficient to provide the "clear incompatibility" necessary for exclusive federal jurisdiction, suits based upon any federal statute would support an argument for exclusive jurisdiction. Although Lane presents a persuasive argument against the Alabama "Dead Man's Statute," that argument should properly be addressed to the Alabama legislature rather than to this court.

The fact that the anti-tying provisions are narrowly drawn and proscribe specific conduct also suggests that exclusive jurisdiction is not necessary to promote national uniformity in the interpretation of the anti-tying provisions. The same cannot be said of the antitrust laws which broadly prohibit anticompetitive and monopolistic behavior. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 354, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2478, 73 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1982) (broad scope of the Sherman Act required the Supreme Court to provide much of the statute's substantive content); 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.

Finally, we note that Congress appears to have perceived no incompatibility between state and federal interests since it allowed the states to enact further legislation in this area.⁴ 

For the above-stated reasons, the decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED.