Billy Don Franklin Boulden, Appellant, v. William C. Holman, Warden, Kilby Prison, Montgomery, Alabama, Appellee, 385 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1967)

Boulden v. State, 179 So. 2d 20 (1965)

State of Texas v. Graves, 380 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Wainwright v. Padgett, 363 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1966); Lyles v. Beto, 363 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1966); Gamble v. Beto, 363 F.2d 831 5th Cir. 1966); Marion v. Harrist, 363 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1966)

Johnson et al. v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1966); Marion v. Harrist, 363 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1966)

We agree with the district court's observation: "While a Court upon a habeas corpus proceeding such as this one is not concerned with guilt or innocence, Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S. Ct. 735, [5 L. Ed. 2d 760,] and while this Court fully recognizes that had either of the confessions been illegally — in a constitutional sense — obtained and then offered and admitted into evidence upon the trial, any subsequent conduct on the part of the defendant — even to the point of testifying and admitting the crime — would not cure the constitutional defect, Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S. Ct. 229, 11 L. Ed. 2d 171, it is interesting to note that Boulden took the witness stand during the trial of this case in the State Circuit Court and testified to almost exactly the same facts to which he had confessed."

This is indeed made the thesis of Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Culombe, supra, where he reviews the historical background of the fundamental tenet of our law respecting self-incrimination.