Duhadaway v. State

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE HENRY A. DUHADAWAY, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. § § § § § § § § § § § No. 2, 2005 Court Below--Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County in PS01-060396; IS01-09-0423. Def. ID No. 0106013189A Submitted: April 28, 2005 Decided: June 20, 2005 Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. ORDER This 20th day of June 2005, upon consideration of the appellant s opening brief and the appellee s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court: (1) The appellant, Henry A. Duhadaway, has appealed from the Superior Court s order of December 3, 2004 that denied his second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ( Rule 61"). The State has moved to affirm the Superior Court s judgment on the basis that the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm. (2) On February 22, 2002, Duhadaway pleaded nolo contendere to one count of Rape in the Second Degree and Unlawful Dealing in Child Pornography. The Superior Court immediately sentenced Duhadaway to a total of twenty-five years at Level V, suspended after serving fifteen years for five years at Level III, followed by five years at Level II. Duhadaway did not file a direct appeal from that sentence. (3) In March 2002, Duhadaway filed his first motion for postconviction relief. By memorandum opinion dated June 19, 2002, the Superior Court denied Duhadaway s motion on its merits. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Superior Court s decision.1 (4) On December 1, 2004, Duhadaway filed a second motion for postconviction relief. Duhadaway s second postconviction motion expanded upon some of the claims that he raised in his first postconviction motion, including ineffective assistance of counsel and violation of due process. In addition, Duhadaway argued that, as a result of his claims of ineffective counsel and violation of due process, he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. 1 Duhadaway v. State, 2002 WL 31127536 (Del. Supr.). 2 The Superior Court denied Duhadaway s second postconviction motion as repetitive2 and as formerly adjudicated.3 This appeal followed. (5) When considering a motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61, the Superior Court must apply the procedural requirements of the rule before reaching the merits of the claims.4 Likewise, on appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, this Court will not consider the merits of the postconviction claims unless the Superior Court has improperly applied the procedural requirements of Rule 61.5 (6) Under Rule 61, a defendant must include all of the available claims in the first postconviction motion.6 Thereafter, absent a showing that consideration of any new claim is warranted in the interest of justice, a subsequent postconviction motion will be barred as repetitive.7 In addition, any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated is thereafter barred, unless 2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 4 See Hamilton v. State, 2004 WL 1097703 (Del. Supr.) (citing Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991) (providing that the Superior Court must apply the procedural bars of Rule 61 before reaching the merits of the claims)). 5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(2). 7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 3 reconsideration is warranted in the interest of justice. 8 A defendant is not entitled to have a court reexamine an issue that has been previously adjudicated simply because the claim is refined or restated. 9 (7) We have carefully considered the postconviction claims in this appeal and conclude that the Superior Court did not err in denying Duhadaway s second motion for postconviction relief on procedural grounds. Duhadaway has made no showing, either in the Superior Court or in his opening brief, that consideration of the claims is warranted in the interest of justice.10 Moreover, Duhadaway s claims do not warrant application of the exception to the procedural bar for repetitive postconviction motions.11 (8) It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is without merit. The issues on appeal are controlled by settled Delaware law, and there was no abuse of discretion by the Superior Court. 8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 9 Collingwood v. State, 2000 WL 1177630 (Del. Supr.) (citing Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (1992) (quoting Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 (1990)). 10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2), (4). 11 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that the bar to relief will not apply to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation). 4 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. BY THE COURT: /s/Henry duPont Ridgely Justice 5

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