Haskins v. Delaware Correctional Center

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE CARL J. HASKINS, JR., Petitioner BelowAppellant, v. DELAWARE CORRECTIONAL CENTER, CATHY L. GUESSFORD, RECORDS DEPARTMENT, Respondents BelowAppellees. § § § § § § § § § § § § § § No. 406, 1999 Court Below Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County C.A. No. 98M-08-022 Submitted: March 23, 2000 Decided: April 28, 2000 Before WALSH, HOLLAND and HARTNETT, Justices ORDER This 28th day of April 2000, upon consideration of the appellant s opening brief and the appellees motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that: (1) The petitioner-appellant, Carl J. Haskins, Jr., filed this appeal from the Superior Court s orders denying his petition for a writ of mandamus and denying reargument. The State of Delaware, as the real party in interest, has moved to affirm the Superior Court s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Haskins opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1 We agree and AFFIRM. (2) Haskins is an Correctional Center ( DCC ). inmate incarcerated at the Delaware In December 1989, the Superior Court sentenced him to a 25-year term of incarceration. In his petition for a writ of mandamus Haskins sought to compel DCC to credit him with 785 days of good time, reflecting his completion of several educational and rehabilitation programs, and to recalculate his sentence accordingly. The State filed a motion to dismiss Haskins petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 2 which was granted by the Superior Court. (3) In this appeal, Haskins claims that: i) the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over his petition; 3 ii) the DCC Executive Committee violated his right to due process by changing the good time policy in 1993; iii) DCC was without statutory authority to change the 1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 2 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b) (6). The State argued in its motion to dismiss that the Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Haskins petition. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b) (1). Because the Superior Court did not reach that issue in its decision, it is not properly before us in this appeal. 3 2 good time policy; iv) the good time policy change was an illegal ex post facto violation; v) the Superior Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for default judgment; 4 and vi) the Department of Justice has a conflict of interest in defending this case. 5 (4) A writ of mandamus is a command that may be issued by the Superior Court to an inferior court, public official or agency to compel the performance of a duty to which the petitioner has established a clear legal right. 6 (5) Dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is appropriate where it appears with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. 7 This issue is reviewable as an interlocutory order of the Superior Court. Robinson v. Meding, Del. Supr., 163 A.2d 272, 275 (1960). 4 This claim was not presented to the Superior Court in the first instance and this Court will not consider it for the first time on appeal. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 5 6 Clough v. State, Del. Supr., 686 A.2d 158, 159 (1996); 10 Del. C. § 564. 7 Ramunno v. Cawley, Del. Supr., 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (1998). 3 (6) Good time credit is an administrative device that provides for an inmate s early release.8 Good time does not exist as a matter of constitutional right, but is strictly a statutory matter.9 Behavior credits may be awarded for an inmate s continuing compliance with the Department of Correction s disciplinary rules and regulations, while merit credits may be awarded for an inmate s participation in certain education, rehabilitation or work programs.10 The Commissioner of the Department of Correction is authorized to designate the appropriate educational and/or rehabilitation programs for which good time credit may be awarded. 11 (7) In this case, the Treatment Supervisor for DCC submitted an affidavit stating that several of the programs cited by Haskins were not designated to receive good time credit and that, based upon his review of Haskins file, Haskins had been credited with all of the good time to which he was entitled. Attached to the affidavit was a copy of Haskins good time record. Based upon the affidavit and supporting documentation, the Superior Court properly held that Haskins petition 8 Snyder v. Andrews, Del. Supr., 708 A.2d 237, 242 (1998). 9 Id. 10 Id. at 243. 11 11 Del. C. § 4381(c). 4 failed to state a claim upon which a writ of mandamus might be granted because he failed to establish a clear legal right to the claimed good time credits. (8) Haskins claims that the 1993 change in the good time policy constituted a violation of his constitutional rights, an ex post facto violation and an act unauthorized by statute are without merit. Good time is not a constitutional right. 12 Furthermore, the Commissioner had the statutory authority in 1993 to change the programs for which an inmate might receive good time credit. 13 (9) Equally unavailing is Haskins claim that the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying his motion for default judgment against the State. The record indicates the State had not properly been served at the time the motion was filed. Thus, the Superior Court was within its discretion and committed no legal error in denying the motion for default judgment. 12 Snyder v. Andrews, 708 A.2d at 242. 11 Del. C. § 4381(c). Haskins does not argue that he had good time credits retroactively eliminated as a result of the policy change in 1993. As such, this case does not present the kind of ex post facto-like situation that occurred in Johnson v. State et al., Del. Supr., 472 A.2d 1311, 1314 (1984). There, this Court held that the unilateral decision of the Department of Correction to give retrospective effect to a judicial decision eliminating the application of good time credits to minimum mandatory prison terms violated due process. 13 5 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a) is hereby GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is hereby AFFIRMED. BY THE COURT: Randy J. Holland Justice 6

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