IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE
v.
LAMAR D. CHURCH,
Defendant.
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I.D. No. 0806006784
Submitted: November 14, 2008
Decided: November 19, 2008
Amended: December 22, 2008
ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
GRANTED
AMENDED OPINION
Daniel McBride, Esquire, Office of the Attorney General, Wilmington,
Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Ralph D. Wilkinson, IV, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant.
ABLEMAN, JUDGE
I. Introduction
Before the Court is a Motion to Suppress filed by Defendant Lamar D.
Church (“Church”), seeking suppression of the drugs seized and of
statements he made during the course of a traffic stop for a noise violation.
Church contends that the traffic stop was unreasonably extended in violation
of the Federal and Delaware constitutions.
Upon consideration of the suppression hearing testimony and the
parties’ supplemental briefing, the Court concludes that both the physical
evidence seized and statements made were obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the
Delaware Constitution. Although Church had been subject to a valid traffic
stop, that stop was illegally extended in both duration and scope beyond
those measures reasonably related to its purpose. For the reasons set forth
more fully herein, Church’s Motion to Suppress is granted.
II. Statement of Facts
At about 8 P.M. on the night of June 5, 2008, a Mitsubishi Montero
(“the Montero”) driven by Church was waiting for a red light at the
intersection of Wilmington Avenue and Washington Street in Wilmington
when Wilmington Police Department Patrolwoman Harlow stopped her
2
patrol car at the same intersection. Officer Harlow observed loud music
emanating from the Montero.
When the light changed, Church turned
southbound onto Washington Street. As Church drove down Washington
Street, Officer Harlow could still hear the car stereo. After observing that
Church’s music could be heard from approximately one-and-a-half city
blocks away, the officer pulled Church over.
Church and the officer provide different versions of the events that
followed.
Officer Harlow testified that she pulled Church over for the
purpose of arresting him, as is “sometimes” her practice upon observing
minor traffic violations. 1
According to Church, Officer Harlow merely
explained that Church had been stopped for a noise abatement violation, for
which he offered an apology.
Officer Harlow requested and received Church’s license, insurance
card, and vehicle registration. Both Church and the officer recount that
Officer Harlow left Church in the Montero and returned to her patrol car to
verify his information. All three documents were valid. Church has several
relatively recent convictions for drug and firearm offenses. For reasons
which will become evident in the foregoing description and analysis of
events, the Court considers it reasonable to assume that Officer Harlow ran
1
See Docket 13, Ex. A (Suppression Hr’g Tr.), 17:5-6.
3
Church’s name through DELJIS while checking the documents he provided
and that this inquiry revealed his prior convictions.
During or just after Officer Harlow’s routine computer check of
Church’s information, his fiancée, Carla Foster (“Foster”), appeared at the
scene from her nearby workplace. When Foster approached the Montero,
she was ordered by Officer Harlow to step away. Foster and Church stated
that Foster stood on the curb, approximately an arm’s length from the
Montero.
Upon returning from the patrol car, Officer Harlow ordered Church
out of the Montero and conducted a pat-down search, which yielded no
weapons or contraband. The officer then handcuffed Church and placed him
in the back seat of the patrol car. At some point, two or three other police
cars arrived at the scene and Officer Harlow spoke with several other
officers.
According to suppression hearing testimony from Church and Foster,
Church asked for an explanation as to why he was being restrained for a
noise violation and Officer Harlow stated that he was not under arrest and
was only being detained. Church and Foster, who owns the vehicle, claim
that Officer Harlow asked each of them for consent to search the vehicle and
that they both refused. Officer Harlow, by contrast, related that she had
4
determined from the outset of the stop to place Church under arrest for the
noise violation and did so, and that she never asked Church or Foster for
consent to search the car. Church also testified that other officers on the
scene stated that they could arrest him and impound the car. According to
Officer Harlow, the other officers suggested to her that she could have the
Montero towed.
After consulting with the other officers, Officer Harlow initiated a
search of the Montero, including the locked glove box. The glove box
contained seven small plastic bags. In addition, officers recovered a small
bag from Church’s front right pants pocket. According to the affidavit of
probable cause, Church spontaneously stated that he had forgotten the bag
was in his pocket. One of the bags from the glove compartment contained a
white chunky substance, which later testing revealed to be approximately six
grams of crack cocaine. The seven other bags taken from the glove box and
Church’s pocket contained a total of six grams of marijuana.
Following the search, the police officers returned the Montero to
Foster. Church was charged with two counts of Possession With Intent to
Deliver a Controlled Substance, one count of Maintaining a Vehicle for
Keeping Controlled Substances, and one count of Loud Music or Noise in
violation of 21 Del. C. § 4306.
5
III. Parties’ Contentions
Church has moved to suppress all evidence seized and statements
made as a result of his detention and the search of the Montero. Church
alleges that the search of the Montero violated the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article 1, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution.
Church urges that the Court should apply Caldwell v. State, which forbids
police from unreasonably extending a traffic stop without independent
justification in order to “employ marginally applicable traffic laws as a
device to circumvent constitutional search and seizure requirements.” 2
Church also argues that the stop of his vehicle was a pretext for an unlawful
search, and thus violates Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution.
In response, the State contends that Caldwell is factually
distinguishable because Church was arrested prior to the search of the
Montero. The State construes Caldwell as applicable only to cases in which
a vehicle is searched in contravention of the Fourth Amendment prior to the
arrest of an occupant. According to the State, Caldwell was arrested before
2
Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1048 (Del. 2001). The defense did not frame its
argument as a Caldwell violation until the suppression hearing, thereby requiring the
Court to order additional briefing from both sides. The position omitted from the original
motion was crucial to the defense’s success and could have affected the course of the
suppression hearing had it been raised beforehand. The Court stresses the importance of
ensuring that motions present complete arguments when they are submitted, rather than
relying upon conclusory language to “get a foot in the door” in hope of finding an
opportunity to flesh out or add new issues at a later date.
6
the vehicle search, which was incident to a valid arrest. In addition, the
State suggests that Church’s pretext argument is untimely, because it was
not raised until after all suppression hearing testimony was concluded and
because the Court ordered supplemental briefing only to address the possible
Caldwell violation. As a result, the State argues that it was unable to elicit
testimony regarding pretext – although the State further notes that none of
the testimony presented supported that Officer Harlow stopped Church for
any reason other than the noise violation.
IV. Standard of Review
Upon a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless
search, the State bears the burden of establishing that the search or seizure
comported with the rights protected by the United States Constitution, the
Delaware Constitution, and the Delaware Code. 3
3
Hunter v. State, 783 A.2d 558, 560-61 (Del. 2001).
7
V. Analysis
A. Validity of the Initial Traffic Stop
Individuals possess the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution. 4 A traffic stop
constitutes a “seizure” of the stopped vehicle and its occupants within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 5 Therefore, a traffic stop, as well as any
police investigation subsequent to that stop, must meet Fourth Amendment
standards for reasonableness. In particular, police must possess at least a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under Terry v. Ohio 6 to initiate a
stop. Furthermore, the scope of both the stop and any further investigatory
activity must be “reasonably related” to the initial justification for the stop. 7
If officers extend the duration of the stop, or engage in investigatory
activities beyond those reasonably necessary to carry out the initial purpose
4
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Del. Const. art. I, § 6 (“The people shall be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no
warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing
them as particularly as may be; nor then, unless there be probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation.”).
5
Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1045-46 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
880-81 (1975)).
6
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
7
Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1046.
8
of the stop, a separate seizure occurs. This “second” seizure or intrusion is
unconstitutional unless the officers can identify specific, articulable facts
providing an independent justification for the additional intrusion.8
Here, Officer Harlow had more than reasonable suspicion, but
probable cause to believe that Church had violated the state’s noise
abatement statute, based upon her personal observation that the Montero’s
stereo was audible from a distance of more than fifty feet away. 9 The
officer’s initial decision to subject Church to a traffic stop was therefore
valid.
B. The Stop Was Not Initiated to Effectuate an Arrest
Pursuant to her valid stop of Church for his noise abatement violation,
Officer Harlow was authorized to conduct activities “reasonably related” to
the purpose of that stop. Although the officer repeatedly asserted at the
suppression hearing that her intent from the start of her encounter with
Church was to arrest him, the Court finds that the initial purpose of the stop
8
State v. Miliany-Ojeda, 2004 WL 343965, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 18, 2004).
9
See 21 Del. C. § 4306(c) (“No person operating or occupying a motor vehicle on any
street, highway, alley, or parking lot shall operate or permit the operation of any music
amplification system, including, but not limited to, any radio, tape player, compact disc
player, or any other electrical device used for the amplification of music in or on the
motor vehicle so that the sound is plainly audible at a distance of 50 or more feet from the
vehicle. For the purpose of this subsection, ‘plainly audible’ means any sound which
clearly can be heard by unaided hearing faculties, however, words or phrases need not be
discernible and bass reverberation alone shall be sufficient to so constitute.”).
9
was to issue a citation or a warning. An objective view of the officer’s
actions indicates that her encounter with Church, at least until she returned
to the vehicle after verifying Church’s information, constituted a detention,
and not an arrest.
Church was not placed under arrest until he was
handcuffed and placed in the patrol vehicle. 10
The Delaware Code defines arrest as “the taking of a person into
custody in order that the person may be forthcoming to answer for the
commission of a crime.” 11 In the absence of indicia of formal arrest, an
arrest occurs “when, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person
would believe that he is not free to leave.” 12 The United States Supreme
Court has observed that the “duration and atmosphere” of routine traffic
stops are generally more analogous to Terry detentions than to arrests. 13
10
See State v. Brown, 1998 WL 961751, at *2-3 (Del. Super. July 27, 1998) (“Absent any
indication that the suspects posed a danger to the officers or possessed [contraband] . . .
officers placed . . . [defendants] in separate patrol cars. At this juncture, any reasonable
person would no longer believe they were free to leave, even though the formal words of
an arrest were lacking. Therefore, I find that placing the handcuffed suspects in separate
patrol cars, where there was no reason to believe that they posed a danger to the officers,
exceeded the scope of the Terry stop, constituting an arrest.”).
11
11 Del. C. § 1901(1).
12
State v. Rizzo, 634 A.2d 392, 395 (Del. Super. 1993).
13
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 & n.29 (1984); see also State v. Bonner,
1995 WL 562162, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 30, 1995).
10
The logical inference from the testimony presented by both sides as
well as the affidavit of probable cause is that Officer Harlow pulled Church
over to issue a citation, or perhaps to give a warning – not to arrest him for a
minor noise violation.
If the officer intended from the outset to arrest
Church when she first encountered him, she likely would have dispensed
with checking his documents while leaving him alone and unattended in the
Montero. Moreover, Officer Harlow’s probable cause affidavit indicates
that she did not advise Church that she was arresting him until after she
returned from verifying his information, not at the time she first pulled him
over. This is consistent with credible testimony from Church and Foster that
Officer Harlow repeatedly told Church that he was not under arrest. 14 The
Court also credits Church’s account of hearing the other officers who
responded to the scene say that they “can” impound the Montero and arrest
him, 15 the implication being that nobody at the scene reasonably considered
Church to have been under arrest at that point in time.
14
Certain aspects of Church’s suppression hearing testimony – particularly assertions that
he and Foster never discussed the particular events of June 5 and that he did not know she
might testify on his behalf – call for a much greater suspension of disbelief than this
Court is willing to extend. Notwithstanding this, in their factual description of the stop
itself, Church and Foster presented credible and consistent accounts.
15
See Docket 13, Ex. A, 35:1-4.
11
The Court would arrive at the same conclusion even if Church had not
testified to his prior drug and firearm convictions; nevertheless, those
convictions supply a plausible explanation for the sequence of events upon
Officer Harlow’s return to the Montero. Although the defense did not crossexamine Officer Harlow regarding knowledge of Church’s record, it appears
likely that she discovered the prior convictions when running a background
check of Church’s license and then, either on her own initiative or with the
input of the other officers at the scene, decided to use what had been a valid
traffic stop as the “springboard” for further investigation. 16 The Court now
turns to the constitutionality of the officer’s decision.
C. Continued Detention and Search Exceeded the Scope of the Stop
As previously discussed, a traffic stop is subject to constitutional
limitations on its execution and duration. If a motorist is stopped to receive
a citation or warning, the stop must conclude “[o]nce the officer has issued a
citation or warning and has run routine computer checks . . . unless the
driver voluntarily consents to further questioning or the officer uncovers
facts that independently warrant additional investigation.” 17
The United
States Supreme Court has noted that, although state laws vary as to the
16
See Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1049.
17
Id. at 1047.
12
circumstances under which a motorist may be taken into custody rather than
issued a ticket or citation, “detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop
is presumptively temporary and brief.” 18
Because the traffic stop is
considered akin to a Terry detention, both “[t]he stop and inquiry must be
‘reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation’”:
Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a
moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to
try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's
suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to respond. And,
unless the detainee's answers provide the officer with probable
cause to arrest him, he must then be released. 19
The constitutional limitations on routine Terry-type traffic stops stand
in contrast to officers’ authority to carry out more extensive investigations
pursuant to a valid arrest. In particular, a police officer may, incident to the
lawful warrantless arrest of a motorist, search the entire passenger
compartment of the car, which would almost certainly encompass a locked
glove box. 20
18
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437 & n.26.
19
Id. at 439-40 (quoting Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881).
20
See Belton v. United States, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 & n.4 (1981); Traylor v. State, 458
A.2d 1170, 1173-74 (Del. 1983). Belton, which authorizes the search of an “open or
closed” glove box, arguably leaves open whether a search of a passenger compartment
incident to arrest encompasses a glove box which is not only closed, but also locked.
This precise situation has not been resolved in Delaware. A number of circuits have
addressed the question, however, and the apparently universal trend is to consider the
locked glove box to be a “container” properly within the scope of a Belton search
incident to arrest. See United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819 (11th Cir. 1996); United
13
The Court agrees with Church that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated when both the duration and intrusiveness of his detention were
extended, as Officer Harlow had already confirmed the validity of his
documentation and thereby completed all activities reasonably related to a
traffic stop to cite or warn for noise abatement. The Delaware Supreme
Court’s treatment of a similar extended traffic stop in Caldwell is
controlling. In Caldwell, officers recognized the defendant as a suspected
drug-dealer and stopped his vehicle for parking in a fire lane. Caldwell
provided documentation upon request, but based upon his reaching to his
side prior to the stop, exhibiting nervous behavior, and failing to know the
identity of his passenger, an officer ordered Caldwell out of the car and then
frisked and handcuffed him. Officers then attempted to recover a razor
blade Caldwell claimed he had placed in the center console of the car,
brought in a drug-sniffing dog, and subsequently performed a more
extensive search of the vehicle that revealed drugs and drug paraphernalia.
After this contraband was discovered, Caldwell was placed under arrest.
The Caldwell Court found that the officer’s decision to frisk and
handcuff Caldwell, along with the later vehicle search, were “entirely
States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868
(8th Cir. 1985).
14
unrelated to the parking violation and exceeded the proper scope of a traffic
stop for a parking violation,” and thus constituted “a second, independent
investigative detention.” 21 Moreover, the facts known to the officer at the
time he conducted the frisk and handcuffing were insufficient to justify the
second detention.
The Caldwell Court concluded that the fruits of the
vehicle search had to be suppressed because “the duration and intrusiveness
of the traffic stop were not reasonably related to the justification for the stop
(i.e., the parking violation) and were not supported by independent facts
justifying the officer’s conduct.” 22
In this case, as in Caldwell, a traffic stop for a relatively minor
violation was extended into an investigative detention and search that
exceeded the justifying purpose of the stop.
The valid traffic stop for
Church’s noise violation supported certain investigative actions, including
the officer’s check of Church’s documentation and inquiries as to his name,
address, business abroad, and destination, as permitted by 11 Del. C. §
1902.23 A non-consensual search of areas of a vehicle not in plain view,
21
Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1049.
22
Id. at 1051.
23
Specifically, 11 Del. C. 1902(a) provides as follows:
(a) A peace officer may stop any person abroad, or in a public place, who
the officer has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed
15
however, is not “reasonably related” to a stop for noise abatement, and the
State has not identified any independent facts supporting the search or the
extended “second” detention. Indeed, there is even less of an argument here
than in Caldwell that the investigative search was supported by independent
facts. Unlike in Caldwell, Church did not make any physical movements
prior to the stop which might have raised officers’ suspicions, and neither his
actions nor his statements during the first part of his encounter with Officer
Harlow provided any basis for further investigation after his documentation
was determined to be valid.
The State argues that Caldwell is distinguishable because Caldwell
was arrested after the search of his vehicle, whereas in the instant case
Church was arrested before the vehicle search, giving rise to a search
incident to arrest. As the State observes, the opinion in Caldwell does not
address whether the search in that case could have been justified as incident
to a lawful warrantless arrest. 24
or is about to commit a crime, and may demand the person's name,
address, business abroad and destination.
The phrase “reasonable ground,” as used in § 1902(a), has been construed to
convey the same meaning as “reasonable and articulable suspicion.” See Jones v.
State, 745 A.2d 856, 861 (Del. 1999).
24
Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1050, n.33.
16
The State’s attempt to distinguish Caldwell is unavailing. The Court
recognizes that 21 Del. C. § 701 vests a police officer with discretion to
arrest without a warrant for any violation of the motor vehicle and traffic
laws committed in her presence, no matter how minor. 25 Here, however,
Church was not placed under arrest until Officer Harlow handcuffed him and
placed him in the patrol car, after all investigative activities reasonably
related to the traffic stop were completed. Although Caldwell does not
squarely address the issue, the Court finds that Caldwell’s principles apply
whenever a routine traffic stop is unreasonably expanded in the absence of
independent justifying facts, regardless of whether police arrest on the
original traffic violation before conducting a search. A contrary rule would
undermine Caldwell and permit officers to evade its constitutional
restrictions on the execution of routine traffic stops by escalating the
intrusiveness of the encounter after the legitimate investigative aspects of the
stop had concluded.
In both Caldwell and the instant case, officers had probable cause to
believe the defendant had committed a minor traffic offense, as well as
statutory discretion to arrest for that minor violation.
25
In neither case,
See 21 Del. C. § 701; Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d at 1174. See also Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may,
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”).
17
however, did officers actually exercise that discretion to arrest at the outset
of the traffic stop. After deciding to initiate a routine traffic stop without
arresting the stopped motorist, officers cannot subsequently employ
“discretion” to extend the duration or intrusiveness of that stop beyond its
initial purpose unless independent facts justify the expanded detention. The
discretion to arrest for minor violations must be carried out subject to the
reasonableness limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 6
of the Delaware Constitution.
The distinction between a detention and an arrest is important at the
initiation of a traffic stop, because officers’ conduct during a Terry-type stop
is limited to those actions reasonably related to effectuating the stop’s initial
purpose. If officers start an encounter as a routine traffic stop and exceed
the constitutional limits on Terry detentions, it is immaterial whether officers
acted via a prolonged detention, an arrest, a search, or a combination of
these measures: the expansion of the stop beyond its initial purpose is
unconstitutional unless sufficiently supported by independent, articulable
facts known to officers before the stop was extended.
Applying this precept in State v. Winn, this Court suppressed evidence
obtained in a vehicle search which unreasonably expanded a traffic stop for
a seatbelt violation, even though the defendant was eventually arrested and
18
charged with the seatbelt violation. 26 Police stopped Winn for failure to
wear a seatbelt after recognizing the vehicle he was driving as one recently
involved in a criminal incident, although Winn had no apparent connection
to this prior crime.
Winn provided valid documentation upon request.
Before issuing a traffic citation, officers conducted further questioning and
sought consent from Winn to search the vehicle. After refusing consent to a
vehicle search, Winn was subjected to a pat-down search. Officers then
either searched the vehicle or saw a bag of suspected drugs in plain view.
Winn was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car. He was charged not only
with the seatbelt violation that originally served as the basis of the stop, but
also with various drug offenses. 27 The Court held that Caldwell required
suppression:
This extension of an investigation after a vehicle stop, beyond
the time necessary to enforce the seatbelt violation, is contrary
to the holding in Caldwell. . . . Since there was insufficient
criminal behavior “independent” of the traffic violation to
justify the extended detention, this Court must, under Caldwell,
suppress the evidence seized during the “second detention.” 28
Winn clarifies the warrantless arrest issue not addressed in Caldwell. Once
officers opt to enforce a traffic violation by a routine stop to cite or warn,
26
2006 WL 2052678, at *2-3 (Del. Super. July 3, 2006).
27
Id. at *1-2.
28
Id. at *4.
19
they cannot rely upon the probable cause from that original traffic violation
to “bootstrap” on to the encounter additional detention or investigative
measures beyond what is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop. In other words, arresting the defendant for the traffic violation as
part of an unconstitutional “second detention” does not cleanse the illegality.
As the Caldwell Court observed, “an officer cannot arrest the
occupant of a vehicle during a traffic stop for an unrelated criminal offense
unless the officer has probable cause to believe that person has committed
the unrelated criminal offense.” 29 To the extent the facts in this case depart
from Caldwell because Church was arrested before the vehicle search rather
than after it, the departure only highlights that any unreasonable extension of
the stop cannot be used to generate probable cause as to an unrelated
criminal offense.
Notably, it was not only the vehicle search in Caldwell that violated
the Fourth Amendment. As soon as officers departed from the limited
questioning of Caldwell permitted by their observing his parking violation,
they initiated a separate, unjustified detention:
[R]ather than continue to question the occupants of the car, the
officer frisked and handcuffed Caldwell and detained him until
another officer arrived. Because these actions were entirely
29
Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1050, n.33 (emphasis in original).
20
unrelated to the parking violation and exceeded the proper
scope of a traffic stop for a parking violation, it was at this
point that the traffic stop ended and a second, independent
investigative detention began. 30
If the frisking and handcuffing of Caldwell constituted a second
investigative detention beyond the scope of a stop for a parking violation, it
follows a fortiori that handcuffing Church and placing him in the patrol car
exceeded the scope of his stop for a noise violation. The pat-down of
Church, the search of the Montero, and the search of Church’s person
incident to that arrest therefore violated Church’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 31
The evidence seized and statements obtained in this case were
procured by exploitation of a Fourth Amendment violation, and the State has
failed to demonstrate “a break in the chain of events” showing that the
30
Id. at 1049.
31
Although Caldwell specifically addressed Fourth Amendment rights, Article I, § 6 of
the Delaware Constitution provides broader protection than the Fourth Amendment.
Milliany-Ojeda, 2004 WL 343965, at *7 & n.40; see generally Flonnory v. State, 805
A.2d 854, 857 (Del. 2001). Because the Court finds that the evidence must be suppressed
as a result of the unreasonable expansion of the traffic stop in this case, it will not address
Church’s argument that the stop was initiated as a pretext to investigate in violation of the
Delaware Constitution.
21
evidence was not a product of the illegality. 32 Accordingly, the evidence
obtained from the searches of the Montero and of Church’s person, as well
as statements made by Church during his illegal detention, must be
suppressed.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is
hereby GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Peggy L. Ableman, Judge
Original to Prothonotary
cc:
32
Ralph D. Wilkinson, IV, Esq.
Daniel McBride, Esq.
Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1052.
22
