State of Delaware v. Krafchick.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY STATE OF DELAWARE v. RENEE KRAFCHICK Defendant ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CRIMINAL ACTION NUMBERS IN-03-04-1691 ID NO. 0301001064 Submitted: May 25, 004 Decided: July 8, 2004 MEMORANDUM OPINION Upon M otion of Defend ant for Post-con viction Relief - DENIED HERLIHY , Judge Renee A. Krafchick pled guilty to Robbery 1st degree on June 25, 2003 and on the same day was sentenced to 4 years at level 5 suspended after 2 years, with 2 years probation to follow. Krafchick filed a motion for reduction of sentence on July 29, 2003, which this C ourt denied on August 26 , 2003. On February 10, 2004, Krafchick, acting pro se, filed a motion for post-conviction relief seeking to withdraw her guilty plea. She also requested an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Super ior Cou rt Crim inal Rule 61(h). T he Cou rt sees no basis to grant the hearing reque st or her motion for post-conviction relief. Krafchick s Motion Krafchick ass erts three ground s for relief: 1. Her counsel did not investigate mitigating evide nce that w ould have resulted in a less severe sentence; 2. Counsel denied her the oppo rtunity to understand the seriousness of the plea and she did not understand the rights she was waiving; and 3. Due to the circumstances and death of her parents, her emotional state was suc h her cou nsel failed to apprecia te it. As to her first cla im, she s ays in a tw o mon th period in early 2003, that she and her lawyer met only twice. She contends counsel did not investigate her case, and in the end, she felt compelled to accept the plea. Her support for the second ground for relief is based on counse l s alleged f ailure to develop mitigating evidence to be used in c onnectio n with 1 her sentencing. Except for his failure, she asser ts, her sen tence w ould hav e been d ifferent. She refers to so me prio r menta l health histo ry, undocumented, to explain why she participated in the offen se. Krafchick appears to have folded the second and third claims into one, and the Court will consider them in that fashion. The Court forwarded Krafchick s initial motion to the attorney against whom she now makes her com plaints.1 He responded by a sworn statement. Based on that response, the Court sees no need for an evidentiary hearing.2 Counsel s reply first states that Krafchick did not respond to his letter asking for witness names and asking she appear for an appointme nt. He did meet up with her at first case review, however. At that time she informed him she had made a full confession to participating as a sexual lure in what became a vicious robbe ry. As of first case rev iew counse l had not review ed the State s discovery response. Her boyfriend had told her, however, that the robbery victim was unlikely to testify. Krafchick, accordin g to counse l, said she wa s underg oing m ental hea lth treatm ent. Subsequently, there was a final case review . By then the State h ad respo nded to discovery supplying a copy of her confession and making it known that the co-defendant 1 Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d). 2 Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 151 (Del. 1996). 2 was go ing to testify against her. The prosecutor was unwilling to consider anything less than a plea to robbery first degree. The prosecutor also told counsel the victim was cooperative. That final case review was on April 7, 2003. Since Krafchick did not plead that day, the case was set for trial which was to be July 3rd. But she was reindicted. The new indictment added charges of assault second degree and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, the newly indicted assault charge, to the original charges of robbery first degree, another weapons charge and conspiracy second degree. She was re-arraigned and had another final case review on May 2 7, 2003 . She did not plea then and the c ase was still marke d for trial. C ounsel re ports that he wrote Krafchick that her decis ion to go to trial had se ntencing conseq uences. Thoug h his response to the Court on this point does not expressly state it, his statement infers that he told her, if convicted on all the charges, she would face a minim um sentence of six years. At her May 27 th case review, she was given a plea window of up until June 30th . The purpose of this window, c ounsel reports, was to make arrangem ents for her then unborn child. She pled to robbery first degree on June 25 th and wa s imm ediately sentenced. Upon receipt of counsel s response, the Court forwarded it to Krafchick to give an opportu nity to reply. She asked for and received more time in which to reply. W hen it was received, however, it raised no new points or added any information. 3 Discussion Krafchick seeks to withdraw her plea base d on a cla im of ineffective assistance of counse l. Such a claim made after sente ncing is g overned by Sup erior Co urt Crim inal Rule 61.3 Rule 61 provides for an evidentiary hearing 4 and Krafch ick has requested one. This Court has the discretion to conduct or not conduct one.5 Based on the vagueness o f Krafchick s claim s and counse l s detailed sworn reply, the Court sees no reason for a hearing. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Krafchick must establish that (1) her attorney s conduct fell below an objective standard or reasonableness and (2) but for counsel s errors, she would not have pled guilty.6 She cannot meet either of these two requirements. She claims counsel somehow deprived her of the opportunity to understand the seriousness of the plea or the righ ts she was w aiving. The first par t of this claim is somewhat vague. Ordinarily the Court does not consider such vague claims. 7 Counsel reports he told her of the consequences of turning down the robbery plea, but he has not 3 Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d). 4 Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(h). 5 Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(h)(1); Maxion, 686 A.2d at 151. 6 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988). 7 Weatherspoon v. State, Del. Supr., No. 591, 2002, Walsh, J. (Feb. 28, 2003) (ORDER). 4 told the Court exactly what these consequences were. Later, she signed a TIS Guilty Plea form for her robbery plea indicating she knew that she faced a sentence of two to twenty years with a two year minimum. The plea agreement said the State was recommending the two year minimum. The Court during the plea colloquy informed her she faced a two year minimum. Krafchick had con fessed. T he victim was go ing to coo perate an d her co- defenda nts were going to testify against her. Under all these circumstances Krafchick knew the seriousness of her situation. She does not explain what about all this she did not understand. Krafchick contends she did not understa nd the rig hts she w as waiv ing . First, th is is a generalized an d conclusory claim. She d oes not specify what rights. Second, in her own initial motion, she acknowledges she is bound b y the TIS guilty plea form.8 The form recites the trial and appeal rights she waived by pleading guilty. In the plea colloquy, the Court made sure she was aware of the trial and appeal rig hts she was waiving. And she is correct, she is bound by her statements during the colloquy an d by her signature on the TIS guilty plea form.9 She has offered no explanation why she is not. Finally, she points to no act of counsel in regard to this claim. 8 She cites Fullman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 268, 1988, Christie, C.J. (Feb. 22, 1989) (ORDER). 9 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629 (Del. 1997). 5 Nor does Krafchick explain h ow any action of c ounsel led to her plead ing guilty to robbery rather than going to trial on all the other charges. In short, she has shown neither counsel deficiency nor prejudice.10 As part of her second ground for relief she mention s that the State s recommendation for her sentence on the robbery first degree charge w as for two years in jail. She acknowledges, again in her pro se motion , that she w as awar e this recommendation was not binding on the Cou rt. 11 Yet in the same breath - the very next sentence - she complains that she received a jail sentence of five years suspended after two years. Her com plaint is that her lawy er should hav e done som ething about the Court s sentence being harsher than the recommendation. Krafchick s complaint makes no sense. First, the two years jail time she received is the minimum for robbery in the first degree. S he knew that from the TIS G uilty Plea form and the plea colloquy. S econd, that two year minim um is include d in the State s recommendation on the ple a agreem ent. Third, the three years of probation about which she comp lains is also in the recommend ation. Fourth, contrary to her complaint, the Court imposed a four year sentence not a five year on e as the State recom mended . She received a less severe sentence then that about which she complains. The last two years, not the last three years, were suspended for a period of probation. 10 Albury, 551 A.2d 53. 11 Krafchick motion for post-conviction relief, 2/10/04, p. 8. 6 All of this dem onstrates th is complaint about counse l s ineffectiv eness lac ks mer it. Conclusion For the reasons stated herein, the motion for post-conviction relief of Renee Krafchick is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. J. 7
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