State of Delaware v. Davis.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY STATE OF DELAWARE, v. TOMMY J. DAVIS, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) I.D. NO. 0106014423 Date Submitted: January 14, 2002 Date Decided: March 26, 2002 MEMORANDUM OPINION U PON D EFENDANT S M OTION FOR S UPPRESSION OF E VIDENCE DENIED Joseph M. B ernstein, Esq., 300 Delaw are Avenue, Su ite 1130, Wilmington , Delaware 19801. A ttorney for D efendan t. Joelle M. Wright, Esq., Department of Justice, Carvel State Building, 820 N. French Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19801. Attorney for the State of Delaware. State v. Da vis I.D. No. 0106014423 July 9, 2002 Page 2 On this 26th day of March 2002, upon consideration of Defendant s Motion for Suppress ion of Ev idence, it app ears to the C ourt that: FACTS On June 19, 2001, University of Delaware Police ( Police ) went to Tommy J. Davis ( Defendant ) residence in Elkton, Maryland. Once there, Defendant was asked to accom pany the polic e officers b ack to the U niversity of D elaware P olice Station to assist in an investigation. Defendant agreed and invited the officers into his residence so that he could get ready to leave. Upon being offered a ride to the station from the police office rs Def endan t agreed , leaving his car a t his resid ence. At the station, Defendant was given his Miranda warnings and the interview was videotape d. The interv iew took p lace on the s econd flo or of the statio n. Appro ximately an hou r throug h the inte rview D efend ant requ ested a b reak, w hich the office rs allow ed. Defendant and the officers proceeded outside of the station for Defendant to smoke a cigarette and have a soda. After the break, Defendant answered more questions for about fifteen min utes befor e again req uesting to sto p. Defen dant indica ted that he w anted to consult w ith an attorney an d get his thou ghts togethe r. When D efendan t requested to stop, Detective Wilson in formed him tha t once he left the room , the opportunity they were affording him would be over. In response, Defendant stated that he was not saying that State v. Da vis I.D. No. 0106014423 July 9, 2002 Page 3 he wanted an attorney present with him, but needed to talk to one before answering any more questions. In addition, Defendant admitted that he knew he could have left the room a nd not a nswe red any q uestion s, but to d o so w ould m ake him look gu ilty. Defend ant volunte ered to con tinue the qu estioning late r in the day after h e relaxed, ate and settled down. He also volunteered to look for letters and/or e-mails from the alleged victim. At this point, the officers offered to take Defendant home. Defendant responded that he w ould re turn on his ow n. At 4:30 that afternoon, the Defendant voluntarily returned to the station as promised. The officers informed Defendant the Miranda warnings remained in force from the morning. Defendant responded that he wanted to know what would happen if he could not a fford an a ttorney. Detectiv e Wilson in formed D efendan t that he wo uld need to call the Public Defen der s Office but stated h e did not believe the Pu blic Defender s Office would defend him until he was charged.1 At some point during the second interview, D efendan t informed the officers that he had letters from th e alleged vic tim in his car. He led the officers to his car and gave them permission to search the vehicle, although no consent to search form was obtained. The officers took some letters they found in the vehicle, as well as a blue blanket from inside the trunk. During the 1 This response is fatal to the State s argument if the Defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation. State v. Da vis I.D. No. 0106014423 July 9, 2002 Page 4 remainder of the second interview, Defendant made incriminating statements and subseq uently w as arres ted and charge d with R ape in th e Third Degre e. ANAL YSIS Defendant now brings this Motion to Suppress all statements made by Defendant to Detective Wilson and Ranger Wales on June 19, 2001 and all physical evidence seized or recovered by police which were fruits of the poisonous tree. The main contention for the motion is that the police continued to question D efendan t after he req uested to co nsult with an attorney. Thus, Defendant argues that he was subject to custodial interrogation when interviewed by the police on June 19, 2001 and therefore afforded Miranda rights. The State contends that Defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation, so no Miranda violation occurred. The outcome of this motion hinges on whether Defendant was in custody at the time of the questioning, so that a Miranda analysis wou ld apply to this situation. The Court determines that Defendant was not in custody on June 19, 2001, thus no Miranda violation occurred and the evidence will not be suppressed. The Miranda warning s guarantee certain proc edural safe guards to D efendan ts while they are subject to custodial interrogation.2 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted custodial interrogation as q uestioning initiated by law enforcem ent officers 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). State v. Da vis I.D. No. 0106014423 July 9, 2002 Page 5 after the person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any signific ant wa y. 3 The Delaware Supreme Court follows this reasoning, equating custodial interrogation with a restraint on freedom of movement associated with a formal arrest. 4 The Court use s the totality of the circumstances test to determine w hether a custodial interrogation occurred.5 Using the totality of the circumstance s test, the Court must determine whether an objectively reasonable person would have felt free to leave the interrogation.6 Under this test, the subjective view of both the interrogating officers and the alleged defendant should not be considered.7 Here, there are two different interrogation sessions to be analyzed. Defendant contends both of these sessions were custodial interrogation. Prior to the morning interrogation, the police showed up at Defendant s house unannounced and all but insisted that he ride with them to the station to be interviewed. In a similar case, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the Defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation, thus not subject to Miranda, even though the Defendant was escorted from 3 Id. at 444. 4 Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185 (Del. 1992) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)); DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1190 (Del. 1995). 5 Id. at 1193; DeJesus, 655 A.2d at 1190. 6 DeJesus, 655 A.2d at 1190; Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995). 7 Id. State v. Da vis I.D. No. 0106014423 July 9, 2002 Page 6 her hom e to the police station and s ubjected to a coercive environm ent. 8 In that case, the police officers arrived at Chao s apartment at 1:45 a.m. and requested that she accompany them to the police station to assist in an investigation.9 Chao agreed and accepted a ride from the police officers.10 At the time of the interrogation, Chao was not under arrest, nor were her freedoms restrained.11 The Delaware Supreme Court noted that [t]he fact that the questioning occurred in a police station does not necessitate a finding of custody since the obje ctive circ umstan ces do n ot sugg est that C hao w as held agains t her wi ll. 12 The same reasoning should apply to the case sub judice. Here, Defendant was free to leave the station at an y time. He vo luntarily accom panied the police off icers to the U niversity of De laware Police S tation. H e was n ot told h e was u nder ar rest, nor w as he ha ndcuf fed. Moreover, the Defendant was given breaks when requested and allowed to return home when he wanted. Thus, the morning interrogation was not custodial and Miranda does not app ly. 8 Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1356 (Del. 1992). 9 Id. at 1351. 10 Id. 11 Id. at 1356. 12 Id. (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977)). State v. Da vis I.D. No. 0106014423 July 9, 2002 Page 7 Moreover, the afternoon interview was not custodial interrogation. The Defendant voluntarily returned to the station on his own. He was not under arrest at this time, nor was he to ld that he w as not free to leave. Du ring the interro gation, De fendant v oluntarily informed the police officers that he brought letters from the alleged victim and had them in his vehicle. At this point, the Defendant escorted the officers to his vehicle where he gave consent for them to search the vehicle. After the search of the vehicle, and consequ ently after the of ficers took c ertain items fr om his car , Defend ant returned with the off icers to th e station to contin ue answ ering q uestion s. From an objective p oint of view , Defend ant was f ree to leave d uring both interviews. Miranda rights only apply to custodial interrogation and not every coercive interview conducted by police officers. Here, a reasonable person in Defendant s place would have felt free to leave. Defendant was allowed to take breaks when he wanted, outside of the s tation. D efend ant wa s allow ed to lea ve wh en he re queste d to do s o. Defendant voluntarily returned to the station for further questioning with no police contact between the interviews. Defendant was not told he was under arrest, nor handcuffed or restrained in any manner during the course of the interviews. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, this was not a custodial interrogation. Thus, Defendant s Motion to Suppress Evidence is Denied. State v. Da vis I.D. No. 0106014423 July 9, 2002 Page 8 For the fo rgoing reas ons, Def endant s M otion for S uppression of Evide nce is here by DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. ______________________________________ ALFORD , J. Prothonotary s Office - Criminal Div.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
