State of Delaware v. Palmer.
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July 10, 2002 Stephanie A. Ts antes, Esquire Department of Justice 114 East Market Street Georgetown, DE 19947 Joseph C. Palm er, Jr. Sussex Correctional Institution P.O. Box 500 Georgetown, DE 19947 Ruth M. Sm ythe, Esquire Office of the Public Defender Mello n Ban k Build ing, 2 nd Floor Georgetown, DE 19947 RE: State of Delaware v. Joseph C. Palm er, Jr. Def. ID#0011016766 Memorandum Opinion Motion for Postconviction Relief Dear M r. Palmer an d Coun sel: This is my decision on defendant Joseph C. Palmer, Jr. s motion for postconviction relief. Palmer was charged by Information on March 12, 2001 with one count of Home Improvement Fraud in violation of 11 Del.C. §916(b)(4 ). Palmer ple d guilty to this charge on June 21, 2001. I ordered a presentence investigation and scheduled sentencing for August 10, 2001. When Palmer failed to appear for sentencing, I issued a capias for his arrest. Palmer was returned on the capias on March 12, 2002. His sentencing was rescheduled for March 22, 2002. The State filed a motion to declare Palmer an habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del.C. § 4214(a). I signed the State s habitual offender motion 1 and sen tenced Palme r to two years at L evel V on M arch 22 , 2002. Palmer filed a motion for postconviction relief on April 23, 2002.1 Palmer took no direct appeal to the Supreme Court. This is Palmer s first motion for postconviction relief and it was filed in a timely mann er. Therefore, there are no p rocedural bars to Palm er s motion for postconviction relief.2 Palme r alleges three gr ounds for relie f. One, Pa lmer alleges that he wa s illegally detained and arrested . The gist of this argument is that, in Palmer s view, he could not be charged with home improvement fraud because he only contracted to work on a commercial structure, not a residential dwelling that does fall within the scope of 11 Del.C. § 916. Thus, acco rding to Palmer, since what he did c ould not be hom e improvemen t fraud, his detention and arrest w ere illegal. However, Palmer s allegations are factually incorrect. 11 Del.C. § 916(a) defines home im provem ent as any altera tion, repair, add ition, modific ation or imp rovemen t to any dwelling or the property on which it is situated . . . There is no definition of dwelling in Section 916. However, a related statute, 11 Del.C. § 917(a)(2), defines a dwellin g as a b uilding which is usuall y occupi ed by a pe rson lod ging th erein at n ight . . . This definition is consistent with the definition of dwelling in another section of the 1 The transcripts of Palmer s plea colloquy and sentencing were completed on May 9, and June 13, 2002, respectively. Palmer s attorney, Ruth M. Smythe, filed a response to the allegations in Palmer s motion for postconviction relief on June 21, 2002. 2 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 2 Delaware Criminal Code.3 The structu re that Palm er construc ted to wor k on wa s, in addition to being a store, also the victim s home, which is su fficient to bring Palmer s actions within the scope of 11 Del.C. § 916. Two, Palmer alleges that he was coerced into entering the guilty plea because he was fac ing life impr isonmen t for wha t, again in his v iew, was nothing m ore than a c ivil dispute. The following excerpts from the plea colloquy make it clear that Palmer was not coerced into entering the guilty plea. THE COURT: THE DEFENDANT: Mr. Palm er, I understan d that you wa nt to plead g uilty to one charge. That charge is home-improvement fraud. Is that what you want to do? Yes. * * * THE THE THE THE THE THE COURT: DEFENDANT: COURT: DEFENDANT: COURT: DEFENDANT: Did anybody force you to take this plea? No. Did anybody coerce you into taking this plea? No. Did anybody threaten you into taking this plea? No, sir. Palm er is b ound by th e sw orn a nsw ers th at he gave during his p lea c olloquy. 4 Three, Pa lmer alleges that his attorne y, Ruth M. S mythe, did no t provide him with effective assistance of counsel. In order to prevail on this claim, Palmer must meet the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.5 In the context of a guilty plea 3 See 11 Del.C. § 471(e). 4 Somerville v. State, 730 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 5 466 U.S. 668, 1045 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 3 challen ge, Strickland requires a d efendan t to show th at: (1) couns el s represen tation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel s actions were so prejudicial that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Palmer alleges that S mythe was ineffective because, d ue to her alleg ed unfam iliarity with business practices, she did not recognize that this was a civil dispute, not a criminal matter. The basis for this, in Palmer s view, is that what he did cannot constitute home improvem ent fraud. I h ave alread y considered th is argume nt and con cluded tha t it is without merit. Therefore, there is no basis for Palmer s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. For the reasons set forth herein, Palmer s motion for postconviction relief must be denied. IT IS SO ORDERED. Very truly yours, E. Scott Bradley ESB/cv cc: Prothonotary 4
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