State of Delaware v. Lindsey.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) v. GERRON LINDSEY, Defendant. I.D. NO. 0002019767 Date Submitted: August 1, 2002 Date Decided: August 28, 2002 ORDER U PON D EFENDANT S M OTION FOR P OSTCONVICTION R ELIEF DENIED Gerron Lindsey, Smyrna, Delaware 19977. Antho ny A. Fig liola, Esq . and Sh eryl Rush -Milste ad, Esq ., Wilmi ngton, D elawa re, Attorneys fo r Defen dant. Stuart Sklut, Esq. and Donald Roberts, Esq., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for the State of Delaware. State v. Lindsey I.D. No. 0002019767 August 28, 2002 Page 2 On this 28th day of August 2002, upon consideration of Defendant s Motion for Postconviction Relief filed by the Defendant and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: (1) Defend ant Gerro n Lindsey ( D efendan t ) was arre sted and ch arged w ith two counts M urder First Degree: one for intentional murder an d one for felony-mu rder, five counts Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony, Attempted Murder First Degree, Attempted Robbery First Degree, two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by Person Prohibited and Robbery First Degree. (2) On April 9, 2002, Defendant accepted a guilty plea offer by the State, which specified that Defendant would plea guilty but mentally ill to Murder First Degree. The State specified that it would not seek the death penalty. The remainder of the charges were to be nolle prossed. On the same date, the Court accepted Defendant s guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation and an evidentiary hearing to establish the foundation for the Defendant s plea of guilty but mentally ill. An evidentiary hearing was held on June 27, 2002 in which Doctor Sylvia Foster testified and satisfied the Court that Defendant was mentally ill at the time he committed the offense. Following the evidentiary hea ring, the Co urt sentence d Defen dant to life im prisonme nt. State v. Lindsey I.D. No. 0002019767 August 28, 2002 Page 3 (3) Before th e evidentiary he aring, Def endant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court denied his motion finding that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the plea agreement. The Court refused to vacate his guilty plea as Defendant merely changed his mind.1 Defendant now files this Motion for Postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of cou nsel. (4) In evaluatin g a postco nviction relief motion, the Court m ust first ascertain if any procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(I) apply to the case.2 If a procedural bar is found to exist, the Court should refrain from considering the merits of the individual claims.3 Summary dismissal is prov ided for pursuant to R ule 61(d)(4) "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal ..." This Court will not address claims for postconviction relief that are conclusory and unsubstantiated.4 Pursuant to Rule 61(a), a motion for 1 State v. Marks, I.D. No. 9408013769, 1999 WL 1611338 (Del. Super. Mar. 22, 1999). 2 See Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 61(I). 3 See Id. 4 See Younger., 580 A.2d at 555; State v. Conlow, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN78-090985R1, Herlihy, J. (Oct. 5, 1990) at 5; State v. Gallo, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN87-03-05890594, Gebelein, J. (Sept. 2, 1988) at 10. State v. Lindsey I.D. No. 0002019767 August 28, 2002 Page 4 postconviction relief must be based on "a sufficient factual and legal basis." In addition, pursuant to Rule 61 (b)(2), "[t]he motion shall specify all the groun ds for relief which are available to movant ..., and shall be set forth in summary from the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified." (5) Moreover, to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Defendant must allege by clear facts the requirements of the Strickland test. 5 Under Strickland, Defendant must show that alleged counsel s course of conduct fell below an objective stan dard of rea sonablen ess and th at such actio ns were p rejudicial. 6 It is settled Delaware law that allegations that are entirely conclusory are legally insufficient to prove ineffective assistance o f counse l.7 Thus, Defendant must be able to show that defense counsel s e rror was o bjectively unrea sonable an d caused prejudice to Defend ant s trial. 8 Here, D efend ant s alle gations are not s ubstan tiated by a ny scintilla o f evide nce. 9 5 Mapp v. State, Del. Supr., No. 003, 1994, Holland, J. (Mar. 17, 1994) (ORDER). 6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 7 State v. Brittingham, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN91-01-1009-R1, Barron, J. (Dec. 29, 1994). 8 9 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Attached to his Motion for Postconviction relief is a Memorandum of Law in Support of Rule 61 Motion for Post-Conviction Relief. This Memorandum clearly does discuss the facts of this case, as it references a 1987 plea agreement along with a five year recommended sentence and a total imposed fifty-five year sentence. Due to the numerous factual references in the Memorandum not related to this case, the Court will not give any weight to the Memorandum. State v. Lindsey I.D. No. 0002019767 August 28, 2002 Page 5 (6) Moreover, Defendant pled guilty to these charges, in doing so he signified that he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by his plea. A defendant is bound by the statements he made on the sign ed Plea Form an d during the in court colloquy unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.10 On the g uilty plea form, D efendan t indicated tha t he freely and v oluntarily decide d to plead guilty to the charge listed in the plea agreement. Most importantly, when asked, Defendant indicated that he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time he signed the guilty plea form that affected his ability to know and to understand the charge against him. Moreover, Defendant also indicated that he understood that the minimum mandatory penalty for the charge he was pleading guilty to would be life imprisonment without the benefit of p robation or parole. Further, D efendant signified in the P lea Form that he w as satisf ied with his attorn eys repre sentatio n of him . In addition, h is attorney indicate d that he ha d extensive conversa tions with Defend ant about th e plea. Prior to the plea collo quy Defen dant was sworn. D efendan t, under oath, stated that he was taking medications for depression and sleep. He further indicated that he was able to understand that he was pleading guilty to Murder in the First Degree and by pleading guilty would be sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant 10 Hickman, at 3-4; Smith v. State, Del. Supr., No. 465, 1989, Walsh, J. (Jan. 4, 1990) (ORDER). State v. Lindsey I.D. No. 0002019767 August 28, 2002 Page 6 acknowledged his signatures on the Truth in Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and the Plea Agreem ent, which in fact indica te that there is a p ossibility of the de ath penalty. His attorney stated o n the record that Defe ndant read the question s for himse lf and wr ote his answers himself. Further, the Court was able to witness Defendant s demeanor during the plea colloquy and found him to be alert and that he verbally answered the questions in an appropriate mann er. For the forgoing reasons the Court finds Defendant s motion merit, thus Def endant s Mo tion for P ostconvictio n Re lief is her eby DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. ______________________________________ ALFORD , J. Prothonotary s Office - Criminal Div.
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