Justia.com Opinion Summary: This case concerned the distribution of surplus proceeds from a foreclosure sale of property encumbered by multiple successive mortgages obtained through fraud. Defendant Stewart Title Guaranty Company appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of Defendant First American Title Insurance Company and ordering that the remaining proceeds of a foreclosure sale be distributed to First American. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly granted First American's motion to intervene in the action, (2) the trial court applied a proper standard of review in granting relief pursuant to First American's motion to reargue the trial court's decision determining the priorities of the parties; and (3) the trial court's conclusion that First American was entitled to receive all of the remaining funds from the foreclosure sale could be upheld on the alternate ground that, because First American's mortgage was recorded prior in time to Stewart Title's mortgage, it was entitled to all of the surplus proceeds on deposit pursuant to the first in time, first in right rule.
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HUDSON VALLEY BANK v. ANDREW M.
KISSEL ET AL.
(SC 18547)
Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh, Harper and Vertefeuille, Js.
Argued October 20, 2011—officially released February 7, 2012
James R. Fogarty, for the appellant (substitute defendant Stewart Title Guaranty Company).
Thomas J. Donlon, with whom was Edward V.
O’Hanlan, for the appellee (defendant First American
Title Insurance Company).
Opinion
McLACHLAN, J. This appeal concerns the distribution of the surplus proceeds from a foreclosure sale of
property encumbered by multiple successive mortgages
obtained through fraud. The defendant Stewart Title
Guaranty Company (Stewart Title) appeals1 from the
judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the
defendant First American Title Insurance Company
(First American),2 and ordering that the remaining proceeds of a foreclosure sale, which were on deposit with
the clerk of the Superior Court, be distributed to First
American. Stewart Title claims that the trial court: (1)
improperly granted First American’s motion to intervene in the action; (2) applied an improper standard of
review in granting relief pursuant to First American’s
motion to reargue the trial court’s decision determining
the priorities of the parties; and (3) improperly concluded, pursuant to an equitable distribution theory,
that First American was entitled to receive all of the
remaining funds from the foreclosure sale. First American argues that the trial court’s judgment may be upheld
on the alternate ground that, because First American’s
mortgage was recorded prior in time to Stewart Title’s
mortgage, it was entitled to all of the surplus proceeds
on deposit pursuant to the first in time, first in right
rule. We agree with First American, and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The trial court set forth the following relevant factual
and procedural background in its memorandum of decision. This foreclosure action concerns real property at
43 Burning Tree Road, Greenwich (property), purchased by the named defendant, Andrew M. Kissel, on
July 27, 2004. At the time of purchase, Kissel obtained
a first mortgage from Washington Mutual Bank (Washington Mutual) in the amount of $1,620,800. The mortgage was recorded in the Greenwich land records
immediately after the recording of the warranty deed
with which Kissel took title to the property. Kissel later
recorded a forged release of the Washington Mutual
mortgage, and then obtained a loan from the plaintiff,
Hudson Valley Bank (Hudson Valley) in the amount of
$4,500,000, secured by a mortgage deed on the property
that was recorded in the Greenwich land records on
March 22, 2005. Thereafter, Kissel used the same
scheme to obtain two additional mortgages on the property. Relying on a forged, recorded release of the Hudson Valley mortgage, he obtained a loan of $1,000,000
from the defendant Independence Community Bank
(Independence), secured by a mortgage deed on the
property that was recorded in the Greenwich land
records on May 25, 2005. Then, in June, 2005, he relied
on a forged, recorded release of the Independence mortgage to obtain a mortgage loan on the property of
$4,525,000 from Fairfield County Bank Corporation,
which was assigned to the defendant Ridgefield Bank
Mortgage Corporation (Ridgefield Bank). The Ridgefield Bank mortgage was recorded in the Greenwich
land records on June 3, 2005. Kissel subsequently
defaulted on all four mortgages.
Hudson Valley commenced the present foreclosure
action against Kissel on August 2, 2005, also naming
Independence and Ridgefield Bank as defendants. See
footnote 2 of this opinion. The court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale on January 29, 2007, at
which time it found the fair market value of the property
to be $2,200,000. The property sold for $2,300,000 at
the foreclosure sale on March 31, 2007. After payment
of the costs of the sale and distribution of the balance
remaining on the Hudson Valley mortgage loan, the
surplus proceeds of approximately $404,000, which are
the subject of this appeal, were deposited with the clerk
of the Superior Court. Stewart Title and First American,
both title insurance companies, each claimed entitlement to all or part of the surplus proceeds.
Stewart Title, which had provided title insurance for
Independence’s mortgage from Kissel, received and
recorded an assignment to Stewart Title of that mortgage from Independence. On May 8, 2006, the trial court
granted Stewart Title’s motion to be made a party defendant to this action. First American had provided title
insurance for both the Washington Mutual and the Hudson Valley mortgages on the property. On March 30,
2007, First American recorded in the Greenwich land
records an assignment to First American of the Washington Mutual mortgage and an agreement subordinating the Washington Mutual mortgage to that of Hudson
Valley. The trial court subsequently granted First American’s motion to be added as a party defendant in this
action.
On September 6, 2008, First American filed a motion
for determination of priorities and further supplemental
judgment, seeking a determination that its interest was
prior to that of all other lien holders in the action,
and, consequently, that First American was entitled to
receive the full amount of the surplus proceeds. Stewart
Title filed an objection to the motion and sought equitable apportionment of the surplus proceeds between
Stewart Title and First American on a pro rata basis.
The matter appeared on the nonarguable short calendar
list for January 5, 2009, and the court, Downey, J.,
sustained Stewart Title’s objection and apportioned the
surplus proceeds as Stewart Title had requested. In
calculating Stewart Title’s pro rata share of the surplus
proceeds, the court considered the amount remaining
on Stewart Title’s mortgage on the property and the
amount that Kissel’s estate owed to Stewart Title in
connection with a judgment that Stewart Title had been
awarded in a separate foreclosure action, concerning
a different property, at 58 Quaker Lane, Greenwich.
Judge Downey stated in a brief, handwritten order: ‘‘The
court, having considered the respective positions of
Stewart Title and First American, recognizing also the
underlying fraud of . . . Kissel, and further considering the overall equities, orders that the remaining
amount of $404,277.71 be distributed as proposed by
Stewart Title, namely $288,896.85 (71.46 [percent]) to
Stewart Title, and $115,380.86 (28.54 [percent]) to First
American.’’ First American subsequently filed a motion
to reargue, which the trial court, Tierney, J., granted.3
The court then ruled in favor of First American, relying
on an equitable distribution theory known as pari passu,
and ordered the clerk of the Superior Court to distribute
to First American the entirety of the surplus proceeds,
along with any accrued interest. This appeal followed.
I
We begin with Stewart Title’s claim that the trial court
improperly granted First American’s motion to be made
a party defendant in the foreclosure action, thus
allowing First American to intervene in the action. The
sole basis of Stewart Title’s claim is that the motion to
intervene was not timely in that it was not filed until
after the foreclosure sale had occurred. We disagree.
The following additional facts are relevant to our
resolution of this claim. The foreclosure action underlying this appeal commenced in a complaint dated August
1, 2005. The court rendered judgment of foreclosure by
sale on January 29, 2007, resulting in a foreclosure sale
on March 31, 2007. On March 29, 2007, First American
received an assignment of the Washington Mutual mortgage, which was recorded in the Greenwich land
records. The next day, First American subordinated its
mortgage to that of Hudson Valley, in an agreement
that was recorded in the Greenwich land records on
that day. On April 13, 2007, First American filed a motion
to be added as a party defendant in this action. In the
motion, First American expressly stated that it did not
intend to assert any defenses to the court’s judgment
of foreclosure by sale, and that the purpose of its intervention was limited to protecting its interest in the
surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale. On April
23, 2007, the court granted the motion to approve the
committee sale and deed. The foreclosure sale was confirmed by the trial court on June 25, 2007.
‘‘[A]ny motion for intervention, whether permissive
or of right, must be timely. See Fed. R. Civ. [P.] 24. The
timeliness of a motion for intervention, however, must
be judged by all of the circumstances of the case. . . .
In any event, an untimely motion for intervention of
right is not transformed automatically thereby into a
motion for permissive intervention. The right to intervene is lost, not merely weakened, if it is not exercised
in a timely fashion. . . . As a general matter, the timeliness requirement is applied more leniently for intervention of right than for permissive intervention because
of the greater likelihood that serious prejudice will
result.4 . . . In making this determination of timeliness
with respect to motions to intervene as a matter of
right, courts must take into consideration the nature
of the interest and for what purpose the intervenor is
seeking to be brought into the action.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington
Trust Co. v. Smith, 241 Conn. 734, 744–45, 699 A.2d 73
(1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Kerrigan
v. Commissioner of Public Health, 279 Conn. 447, 455,
904 A.2d 137 (2006).5
Washington Trust Co. v. Smith, supra, 241 Conn.
738, involved two motions to intervene, both of which
were filed after the foreclosure sale had been held, but
before the confirmation of the sale by the court. In
evaluating whether the motions to intervene were rendered untimely by virtue of being made after the foreclosure sale, we examined the nature of the interest
asserted by each of the intervenors—both relied on an
asserted right of redemption—and whether those rights
survived the foreclosure sale. Id., 741–42. Because a
foreclosure sale is not absolute until it is confirmed by
the court, we concluded that the right of redemption
survives the foreclosure sale, and, therefore, that a
motion to intervene to protect the right of redemption
is timely when filed before confirmation of the sale.
Id., 742–43.
Similarly, in the present case, First American’s only
asserted interest in the foreclosure action was in receiving the surplus proceeds. Because the foreclosure sale
did not extinguish that interest, we conclude that the
filing of the motion to intervene following the sale and
prior to the confirmation of the sale was timely. Moreover, First American did not have an interest in the
property until it received the assignment of mortgage
on March 29, 2007, and it filed its motion to intervene
reasonably promptly, only fifteen days later, on April
13, 2007.6
II
Stewart Title next claims that the trial court applied
an improper scope of review in addressing the merits
of First American’s motion to reargue.7 Specifically,
Stewart Title contends that Judge Tierney was required
to review Judge Downey’s decision apportioning the
surplus proceeds between First American and Stewart
Title for abuse of discretion. We disagree.
The question of whether Judge Tierney was required
to give deference to Judge Downey’s decision in considering First American’s motion to reargue presents a
question of law, over which we exercise plenary review.
‘‘[T]he purpose of a reargument is . . . to demonstrate
to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and
which has been overlooked, or that there has been a
misapprehension of facts. . . . It also may be used to
address . . . claims of law that the [movant] claimed
were not addressed by the court. . . . [A] motion to
reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity
to have a second bite of the apple . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Chapman Lumber, Inc. v.
Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 94 n.28, 952 A.2d 1 (2008). Moreover, we have stated that ‘‘[a] judge is not bound to
follow the decisions of another judge made at an earlier
stage of the proceedings, and if the same point is again
raised he has the same right to reconsider the question
as if he had himself made the original decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Kirshner, 225
Conn. 185, 192, 621 A.2d 1326 (1993).8 We reject the
notion that a trial judge who determines that a legal
error has occurred must allow the error to be memorialized until it can be corrected by appellate review.
First American relied on the motion to reargue for a
proper purpose—to call to the attention of the court
the controlling principle of law that Judge Downey had
failed to apply. In its motion for determination of priorities, First American relied on the well established first
in time, first in right rule in arguing that it was entitled
to receive distribution of all of the surplus proceeds
because its mortgage had been recorded prior to those
of the other remaining lien holders. In its objection to
First American’s motion, Stewart Title instead
requested that the court equitably apportion the surplus
proceeds, arguing that its pro rata share should be determined on the basis of the mortgage it held on the property and the award it had recovered in relation to a
foreclosure action on a different property. Judge Downey apportioned the proceeds according to the ratios
that Stewart Title proposed, calculating Stewart Title’s
share on the basis of its interests in the two properties.
In an instance such as this, where the court not only
failed to apply the controlling law under which First
American would be entitled to receive all of the surplus
proceeds, but took the extra, inexplicable step of
allowing Stewart Title to recover on the basis of an
award that was made in connection with an entirely
different property in a different proceeding, Judge Tierney properly granted reargument and gave plenary consideration to the merits.9
III
Finally, we address Stewart Title’s claim that the trial
court improperly concluded that First American was
entitled to recover all of the surplus proceeds. The trial
court arrived at its conclusion by applying the doctrine
of pari passu. First American argues that the trial court’s
decision may be affirmed on the alternate ground that,
pursuant to the first in time, first in right principle, First
American was entitled to recover all of the surplus
proceeds because its mortgage was executed and
recorded prior to that of Stewart Title. We agree with
First American that the judgment of the trial court may
be affirmed on this alternate ground.
‘‘The law relating to the priority of interests has its
roots in early Connecticut jurisprudence. A fundamental principle is that a mortgage that is recorded first is
entitled to priority over subsequently recorded mortgages provided that every grantee has a reasonable time
to get his deed recorded.’’ Independence One Mortgage
Corp. v. Katsaros, 43 Conn. App. 71, 73, 681 A.2d 1005
(1996); accord Brown v. General Laundry Service, Inc.,
139 Conn. 363, 372, 94 A.2d 10 (1952), vacated on other
grounds, 347 U.S. 81, 74 S. Ct. 367, 98 L. Ed. 520 (1954);
Beers v. Hawley, 2 Conn. 467, 469 (1818). It is undisputed that the Washington Mutual mortgage now held
by First American was recorded before the Independence mortgage now held by Stewart Title. That mortgage originally was the first mortgage on the property,
and was subordinated only to Hudson Valley’s mortgage, making it, for practical purposes, the second mortgage on the property. Stewart Title’s mortgage was
recorded after Hudson Valley’s mortgage, making it the
third mortgage on the property. Accordingly, First
American’s mortgage is prior to Stewart Title’s and First
American is entitled to recover the entire surplus proceeds on deposit in the clerk’s office.10
Stewart Title’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Its primary substantive argument appears to
be that the present case is governed by this court’s
decision in Bryson v. Newtown Real Estate & Development Corp., 153 Conn. 267, 271, 216 A.2d 176 (1965),
in which we upheld the trial court’s application of equitable apportionment to the surplus proceeds from a
foreclosure sale. Bryson, however, is distinguishable
from the present case, and does not suggest that the
‘‘first in time’’ rule does not apply to surplus proceeds.
Bryson involved a parcel consisting of four contiguous
tracts of land. There were three mortgages at issue in
the case, given and recorded in the following order: (1)
the defendant owner gave a first mortgage to the plaintiff on all four tracts; (2) the defendant owner next gave
a mortgage to the defendant Paul Pellegrino on only
one of the four tracts; and (3) the defendant owner
gave a mortgage on all four tracts to the defendant
Edward M. Derman. Id., 268. Both the plaintiff and Pellegrino subsequently brought foreclosure actions, which
were consolidated and resulted in a judgment of foreclosure by sale.11 Id., 269. After the plaintiff’s claim and
the costs of the sale were paid, the trial court apportioned the surplus proceeds between Pellegrino and
Derman, arriving at the pro rata shares on the basis of
its finding that the single tract of land on which Pellegrino held a second mortgage had a value of $35,000
and that the three tracts of land on which Derman held
a second mortgage had a value of $69,000. Id., 270.
Accordingly, the court determined that Derman was
entitled to a pro rata share of 66.35 percent of the
surplus proceeds. Because that amount exceeded the
amount claimed by Derman, the court awarded the
remainder to Pellegrino, in addition to his pro rata share
of 33.65 percent of the surplus proceeds. Id. On appeal
to this court, Pellegrino claimed that the court properly
should have distributed the surplus proceeds according
to the ‘‘first in time’’ rule rather than apportioning the
proceeds. See id., 271. We disagreed, observing that
Pellegrino’s only interest was in the single tract of land
on which he was a second mortgagee. Accordingly, his
equity in that tract of land ‘‘was limited to a claim on
that portion of the value of the property remaining after
the first mortgage had been satisfied.’’ Id. Our holding
specifically was limited to circumstances in which subsequent encumbrancers have been given security interests on separate estates. In such a circumstance, we
concluded, the subsequent mortgagees each ‘‘should
share the burden of the first mortgage according to the
proportionate value of their security interests.’’ Id., 272.
Moreover, in rejecting Pellegrino’s claim that a rule of
priority should have been applied, we observed that
the trial court had treated two second mortgages
equally—the second mortgage held by Pellegrino on
the single tract of land and the second mortgage held
by Derman on the remaining three tracts. Id., 273.
Accordingly, we concluded that ‘‘it was proper for the
court to apportion the surplus between them according
to the respective values of their security.’’ Id. Bryson,
therefore, does not govern the present appeal, which
involves First American’s second mortgage and Stewart
Title’s third mortgage on the identical piece of property.
Equitable apportionment among the subsequent mortgagees would be improper under these facts.
Finally, although we have resolved this appeal on the
alternate ground for affirmance, we take the opportunity to clarify that the doctrine of pari passu, which the
trial court stated it was applying in reaching the same
conclusion, does not apply under the facts of the present case, and, in fact, represents a significant departure
from our established precedent. ‘‘Pari passu’’ as
explained by the trial court, is a Latin phrase that means
with ‘‘ ‘equal step.’ ’’ Black’s Dictionary explains that
the phrase is ‘‘[u]sed especially of creditors who, in
marshalling assets, are entitled to receive out of the
same fund without any precedence over each other.’’
Blacks Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990), p. 1115. ‘‘Marshalling assets’’ refers to ‘‘an equitable doctrine requiring
a senior creditor, having two funds to satisfy his debt,
to resort first to the one fund which is not subject to
the demand of a junior creditor of the common debtor,
to avoid the inequity which would result from an election of the senior creditor to satisfy its demand out of
the only fund available to the junior creditor, thereby
excluding the junior creditor from any satisfaction.’’ Id.,
pp. 973–74. The doctrine of pari passu ordinarily is
applied in the context of bankruptcy proceedings as
opposed to foreclosure proceedings, in which we apply
the principle of first in time, first in right. Compare
Robinson v. Security Co., 87 Conn. 268, 270, 87 A. 879
(1913) (applying doctrine of pari passu in bankruptcy
proceedings), with Independence One Mortgage Corp.
v. Katsaros, supra, 43 Conn. App. 73 (applying first in
time, first in right principle in foreclosure proceedings).
A close reading of the trial court’s memorandum of
decision reveals that the court implicitly recognized
the incompatibility of the doctrine of pari passu to the
distribution of assets in a foreclosure action.12 In its
purported application of the doctrine of pari passu, the
court recognized that, following the foreclosure sale,
there remained three levels, or classes, of claimants. In
the first level was First American, by virtue of holding
the first recorded mortgage. Hudson Valley and Independence occupied the second and third levels respectively, by virtue of the dates on which their respective
mortgages were recorded. After determining that First
American alone occupied the first level, and that its
claim exceeded the amount of the surplus proceeds,
the court ‘‘distributed’’ all of the surplus proceeds to
First American as the sole creditor in that level, supposedly pursuant to the doctrine of pari passu. This was
nothing more than an implicit application of the first
in time, first in right doctrine to the distribution of the
surplus proceeds, which we emphasize is the applicable
doctrine to determine the distribution of surplus proceeds following a foreclosure sale.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1
Stewart Title appealed from the decision of the trial court to the Appellate
Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
2
The plaintiff, Hudson Valley Bank, is not a party to this appeal. In its
complaint, Hudson Valley Bank named the following defendants: Andrew
M. Kissel; Independence Community Bank; Ridgefield Bank Mortgage Corporation; Sabia Landscaping, Inc., Hayley Kissel, R.S. Granoff Architects, P.C.,
and Robert Rozmus Plumbing and Heating, Inc. After Andrew Kissel died
on April 3, 2006, Patrick Gil, the administrator of Andrew Kissel’s estate,
was substituted as a defendant. Subsequently, Stewart Title was substituted
as a defendant in place of Independence Community Bank, First American
was added as a defendant, and Fidelity National Title Insurance Company
was substituted as a defendant in place of Ridgefield Bank Mortgage Corporation. Stewart Title and First American are the only parties involved in the
present appeal.
3
When First American’s motion to reargue was assigned for a hearing,
Judge Downey was no longer a judge of the Superior Court.
4
First American did not expressly seek to intervene as of right in its
motion to be added as a party defendant and does not claim on appeal that
it was entitled to intervene as of right. It is unnecessary for us to determine
whether First American would have been allowed to intervene as of right,
however, because even without the benefit of the more lenient application
of the timeliness analysis, we conclude that First American moved to intervene in a timely manner.
5
The standard of review of a trial court’s decision regarding the timeliness
of a motion to intervene is less than clear. Although Washington Trust Co.
v. Smith, supra, 241 Conn. 744–45, refers to the trial court’s broad discretion
in ruling on a motion to intervene, we later overruled Washington Trust
Co. in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra, 279 Conn. 454–55,
on the sole issue of the applicable standard of review. In Kerrigan, we
concluded that we are required ‘‘to review de novo the trial court’s determina-
intervention as a matter of right.’’ Id., 454. Because the timeliness of the
motion in Kerrigan was not at issue in that appeal, however, we specifically
declined to reconsider the ‘‘standard of review applicable to the trial court’s
initial determination of timeliness’’; id., 455 n.11; and reserved for the future
any possible reconsideration of that standard. In the present case, the parties
have not briefed the issue of the proper standard of review of the trial
court’s timeliness determination. Stewart Title simply has asserted in a title
heading, with no support or argument, that the standard of review is plenary.
First American has recognized the uncertainty of the applicable standard
of review, but declined to brief the issue on the basis that even under the
broader, de novo level of review, the trial court’s timeliness determination
withstands scrutiny. We agree with First American’s assessment and review
the court’s timeliness determination de novo, reserving for a future case
the question of whether we will reconsider the application, in Washington
Trust Co., of the abuse of discretion standard of review.
6
Stewart Title appears to suggest that because First American provided
no explanation as to why it waited until March 29, 2007, to receive the
assignment of mortgage from Washington Mutual, we should measure timeliness from an earlier stage in the proceedings. Stewart Title’s brief does not
clarify precisely what that earlier stage should be, and instead vaguely
suggests that First American was obligated to receive the assignment of the
mortgage from Washington Mutual ‘‘sooner.’’ As Stewart Title has cited to
no authority in support of its claim, we do not address it.
7
Stewart Title also points out that in seeking reargument, First American
incorrectly cited to Practice Book § 11-12, which governs motions to reargue
an interlocutory order, rather than Practice Book § 11-11, which governs
motions to reargue a decision that constitutes a final judgment for purposes
of appeal, and requires that the moving party ‘‘shall indicate on the bottom
of the first page of the motion that such motion is a Section 11-11 motion.’’
It is unclear what inference Stewart Title is asking the court to draw from
the failure to comply with Practice Book § 11-11. Although Stewart Title
seems to imply that the procedural error precluded Judge Tierney from
permitting reargument, Stewart Title concedes that the standards governing
the two rules of practice are not distinguishable, and admits that several
decisions of the Superior Court have overlooked the same error, and permitted reargument. To the extent that Stewart Title’s brief could be interpreted
to challenge Judge Tierney’s decision to grant reargument on the basis of
First American’s failure to comply with Practice Book § 11-11, we deem
that claim to be abandoned.
8
In support of its claim that a judge may not consider an issue de novo
on reargument, Stewart Title cites to several of our decisions indicating
that we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny reargument for abuse
of discretion. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Weinstein, 275 Conn. 671, 705, 882 A.2d
53 (2005). Stewart Title also relies on our decision in Miko v. Commission
on Human Rights & Opportunities, 220 Conn. 192, 201–202, 596 A.2d 396
(1991), in which we concluded that the trial court improperly failed to apply
substantial evidence review of the agency’s decision, as required by the
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. Neither a trial court’s review of an agency’s decision nor our review of a trial
court’s discretionary decision is analogous to the decision of a trial court
in deciding the merits of a motion to reargue, where the trial court makes
its ruling as a matter of law.
Stewart Title also states in its brief that Judge Tierney needed its consent
in order to afford plenary consideration to the question of the proper allocation of the surplus proceeds, and further suggests that Judge Tierney shared
this belief. The fact that Judge Tierney may or may not have mistakenly
believed that he needed the consent of the parties in order to consider the
issue de novo is immaterial.
Additionally, the parties’ various disagreements—as to whether First
American did or did not request oral argument when it initially filed the
motion, whether Judge Downey was obligated to hear oral argument and
whether Judge Tierney based his decision in part on a belief that Judge
Downey’s judgment was defective because he decided the motion without
hearing oral argument—have no bearing on our analysis.
9
Additionally, Stewart Title suggests that because a foreclosure action is
one in equity, the abuse of discretion standard must apply. Even when a
court sits in equity, however, its resolution of a question of law, such as the
determination of the applicable legal principle, is subject to de novo review.
10
Stewart Title claims that, because neither Judge Downey nor Judge
Tierney applied the first in time, first in right rule, First American may not
rely on that theory as an alternate ground for affirmance. Additionally,
although Stewart Title concedes that First American raised this issue as an
alternate ground for affirmance in its preliminary statement of the issues,
it contends that, because First American failed in its brief to use the phrase
‘‘alternate ground for affirmance’’ in setting forth this issue, First American
may not rely on the first in time, first in right principle as an alternate
ground for affirming the decision of the trial court. None of Stewart Title’s
claims have any merit. First American raised the issue to the trial court in its
original motion and in the motion to reargue, identified it in the preliminary
statement as an alternate ground, and has argued the issue to this court.
The issue is properly before us as an alternate ground for affirmance.
11
Originally, the court rendered two judgments of foreclosure by sale,
one in each case. The Pellegrino judgment subsequently was vacated. Bryson
v. Newtown Real Estate & Development Corp., supra, 153 Conn. 269.
12
As we already have explained, the present case does not involve facts
that are analogous to Bryson, in which it was possible to marshall the assets.
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